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ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR—
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SUITS AS TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION VEHICLES
George D. Brown∗
Abstract
This Article examines the role of civil suits in providing accountability
for the Bush administration’s conduct of the “war on terror.” There have
been calls for a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to perform this
function, almost like a retroactive impeachment of President Bush. For
now, the idea appears to be dead, especially since many of the policies
have continued under President Obama. Increasingly, the default
accountability mechanism for questioning government conduct is the array
of civil suits against federal officials by self-proclaimed victims of the war,
cases which might be referred to as reverse war on terror suits. Many of
these suits are high profile, including Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Padilla v. Yoo, and
Arar v. Ashcroft.
These suits often fail at the threshold. This Article examines the
specific reasons for these failures—including the Bivens doctrine, qualified
immunity, and the state secrets privilege—and explores their underlying
causes. It identifies both a systemic hesitation to use the tort suit as a
vehicle for questioning government policy and an enhanced hesitation
when the policy involves national security, an area of high judicial
deference to the government. In addition to these problems, the Article
concludes that the suits, like the commission proposal, suffer from the
same retributive motivation and premises. The legal climate that reverse
war on terror suits face may become more receptive. Perhaps, however, the
goal of accountability should be re-examined and sought through other
means.
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It has always been true that a real accounting of the Bush
administration’s abuses is vital if Mr. Obama truly wants to
repair them and try to prevent them from recurring. It is more
important than ever now, when the Republican right is trying
hard to turn the clock back to those dark times by painting
Democrats as “soft on terror” during an election year.
–The New York Times**
I. INTRODUCTION
Long after George W. Bush left office, his administration’s antiterrorism efforts remain the subject of intense controversy. Supporters, led
by former Vice President Dick Cheney, insist that the strong measures of
the war on terror were necessary to keep the nation safe.1 Opponents, led
by the New York Times, denounce these efforts as unconstitutional
violations of civil liberties and an abandonment of fundamental American
values.2 The division is deep; the debate continues.
**

Editorial, Seven Paragraphs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A20.
1. Joseph Williams & Bryan Bender, Obama and Cheney Clash on the Fight Against
Terror, BOS. GLOBE, May 22, 2009, at A1.
2. Editorial, One Hundred, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A22 (“[President Obama] needs to
rethink . . . his opposition to a full public inquiry to determine why, how and by whom so many
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Some have called for a national inquiry into the war on terror.3 Their
general goal is “accountability,” and the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission is the apparent model.4 Fault on the part of the
Bush administration is assumed. Prominent among the specific goals of
any such commission would be determining what policies were at the
center of the war on terror, what governmental actions rose to the level of
constitutional violations, and how to prevent such errors from occurring in
the future.5 To this date, however, no commission has been established.
Indeed, the formation of any such body seems increasingly unlikely. There
are several reasons why this is so.
First, the war on terror continues. Observers from different ends of the
political spectrum have noted, sometimes with chagrin, the degree to which
President Barack Obama has kept in place policies and practices of his
predecessor.6 Another reason is that the widely touted South African model
is singularly inappropriate.7 America is not emerging from a civil war. We
have not changed our form of government. Controversial though it may be,
the Bush administration’s war on terror did not leave permanent scars on a
large swath of the body politic. Perhaps the major reason why calls for an
American Truth and Reconciliation Commission have foundered is a
fundamental ambiguity about the role of the body. Is it an inquiry into what
policies have been followed to combat terrorism and whether they should
be continued in the future (mindful of the need to balance national security
with concerns for individual liberties)? Or is it an exposé of what the Bush
administration did wrong, assuming guilt and apportioning blame? The
former might be called the inquiry model; the latter the retributive model.
The emphasis of proponents like Senator Patrick Leahy on retribution8 has
hobbled the effort from the start. Not surprisingly, the political system has
resisted calls for a retroactive impeachment.
The thesis of this Article is that, despite the lack of a formal
commission, we already have an accountability mechanism that operates
with increasing frequency and prominence: the tort suits brought by selfproclaimed victims of the war on terror against present and former
government officials. Grievances have included extraordinary rendition,9
orders were given to violate the law and the most cherished Constitutional rights.”).
3. E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Time to Come Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at
WK14.
4. See Senator Patrick Leahy, Restoring Trust in the Justice System: The Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Agenda in the 111th Congress, Remarks at the Marver H. Bernstein Symposium on
Governmental Reform at Georgetown University (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.truthout.org/021009K (invoking the South African experience).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, To Critics, New Policy on Terror Looks Like Old, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2009, at A14.
7. See Jack M. Balkin, Op-Ed., A Body of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at WK11.
8. See Leahy, supra note 4.
9. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009).
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unauthorized surveillance,10 conditions of confinement,11 and unauthorized
detention.12 Defendants have ranged from the former Attorney General and
the Director of the FBI to corrections officials and prison guards.13 Some
of the suits in question are high profile, such as the action by “enemy
combatant” Jose Padilla against former Bush Justice Department official
John Yoo.14 Beyond compensation, there is also often a broader, political
dimension. For example, Padilla sought damages of $1 in his suit based on
injuries to constitutional rights flowing, ultimately, from Yoo’s advice to
other government officials.15
Such actions might be referred to as reverse war on terror suits. Instead
of the government bringing a criminal proceeding against a suspected
terrorist, former suspects sue officials in civil, usually tort, actions.
However, as this Article will develop, reverse war on terror suits face a
striking number of obstacles. There is an array of doctrines that seriously
constrain their availability. Finding a right of action is an initial constraint,
particularly given the limits on constitutional tort suits brought under the
doctrine derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.16 The Bivens doctrine is the principal means of
getting reverse war on terror suits into court. Alternative causes of action
are difficult to establish.17 Getting past this stage is only the beginning.
Official defendants will enjoy qualified immunity, preventing many suits
from being heard.18 Even if denied, the immunity defense can tie a lawsuit
into knots since the denial is subject to appeal under the collateral order
doctrine.19 Attempts to hold high-level officials liable will encounter
problems of limits on supervisory liability, especially after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.20 Assertions of the state secrets
privilege can limit the plaintiff’s suit or block the suit altogether.21 It is true
that in Marbury v. Madison,22 Chief Justice John Marshall declared that
10. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
11. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79
U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98).
13. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943.
14. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
15. First Amended Complaint at 21, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(No. 3:08-cv-00035), 2008 WL 2433172.
16. See George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 858–66 (2009) (discussing at length Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1970)).
17. See infra Part III.C.1.
18. See Note, Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1163
(2009).
19. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945–47 (2009) (discussing the collateral order
doctrine).
20. Id. at 1949.
21. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007).
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.”23 That right, however, is far from absolute, even in a public law
system based on Marbury.
This Article considers the question of why such suits are so difficult to
bring. One possibility is that the legal system reflects, implicitly, the view
that tort suits are an imperfect vehicle for evaluating and formulating
public policy, particularly binding constitutional limits. For example, an
individual suit may consider only a tiny slice of a broader systemic
problem. I do not believe, however, that such objections are a sufficient
explanation for the difficulties that reverse war on terror suits encounter.
Constitutional adjudication is an integral part of our system, and at the
state and local level, policies are affected, even made, through
constitutional tort suits brought under § 1983.24 Theories of adjudication
emphasize its legitimacy as a means of formulating public values.25 The
common law has played an indispensable role in formulating and enacting
policy in general. At the constitutional level, individual criminal actions, to
take one example, have been the dominant mode of formulating limits on
criminal procedure.26
The major part of the answer lies elsewhere: problems raised by suits
that are, in effect, challenges to the government’s anti-terrorism policies.
What is the proper role of the courts in such challenges? They inevitably
produce calls for judicial deference in matters of national security, calls
which are often heeded.27 Boumediene v. Bush led to a sharp exchange
within the Court over whether the decision represented judicial usurpation
of power over national security policy.28 The Supreme Court’s apparent
assertiveness in habeas corpus cases such as Boumediene may not carry
over to other forms of suits attacking anti-terrorism policies. Certainly, the
result in Iqbal suggests this conclusion,29 as does the more recent decision
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.30 Habeas actions may occupy a
central place in the constitutional order that damages suits do not.31 Thus,
there are practical and theoretical problems with the notion of the
23. Id. at 163.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 332–37.
26. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1961). Many of these decisions were
collateral review actions via federal habeas corpus.
27. See, e.g., Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
28. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 849–50 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Iqbal was the first post-September 11 Supreme Court decision in a damages suit. Its
predecessors involved habeas corpus. The Court found, or suggested, several ways in which the
plaintiff’s claim was deficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952–54 (2009).
30. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). Holder was a pre-enforcement challenge to an anti-terrorism
criminal statute. The Court specifically invoked deference and embraced the “preventive” approach
to terrorism. See id. at 2728.
31. See Brown, supra note 16, at 895–900 (discussing the distinction between habeas corpus
cases and damages suits).
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constitutional tort action as the legal and political systems’ preferred means
of achieving truth and reconciliation goals. Yet, it may be the most
important one we have.
Injunctions will rarely be available.32 Prosecutions on any large scale
are unlikely.33 Other institutions are, of course, potentially available. The
existing mix of inspectors general and congressional committees can lead
to reports and hearings that help us learn about past practices and shape
future ones.34 The more potent of the two—congressional hearings—can
suffer from the same partisanship that weakened the initial proposal to
create a truth and reconciliation commission. Perhaps that proposal should
be definitively scrapped in favor of something like the 9/11 Commission
with a broad and open mandate. Whether the political system is up to the
task is an open question.35 For the moment, the legal system’s
contribution—the civil suit, particularly the constitutional tort suit—is the
major truth and reconciliation vehicle available.
This Article first considers briefly, in Part II, the concept of a truth and
reconciliation commission as advanced by Senator Patrick Leahy. As
argued above, there are basic flaws in his approach. The analysis
concludes that an essentially retributive commission will almost certainly
not be formed. Part III begins by examining the concept of
accountability—the core of any truth and reconciliation effort. It advances
the proposition that reverse war on terror suits are serving, by default, as
32. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge to amendment of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act). Most potential plaintiffs will lack standing either because they
cannot show that a wrong happened to them at all or because they cannot show one will happen
again. Moreover, the action for an injunction can put a court in the position of exercising a form of
ongoing control over a coordinate branch in the area of national security.
33. See Daniel L. Pines, Are Even Torturers Immune from Suit? How Attorney General
Opinions Shield Government Employees from Civil Litigation and Criminal Prosecution, 43 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 93, 94 (2008) (“[A] government employee is effectively immune from both civil
claims and criminal prosecution for actions undertaken in reliance upon an Attorney General
opinion.”). Prosecutions would be extremely controversial. They also have a hit-or-miss quality.
Many possible defendants will escape prosecution because they relied in good faith on legal advice,
evidence is unavailable, or the statute of limitations has run. See Press Release, Matthew Miller,
Dir., Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Statement on the Investigation
into the Destruction of Videotapes by CIA Personnel (Nov. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-ag-1267.html (noting, “In January 2008,
Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to
investigate the destruction by CIA personnel of videotapes of detainee interrogations. Since that
time, a team of prosecutors and FBI agents led by Mr. Durham has conducted an exhaustive
investigation into the matter. As a result of that investigation, Mr. Durham has concluded that he
will not pursue criminal charges for the destruction of the interrogation videotapes.”).
34. See generally Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357 (discussing accountability mechanisms,
primarily in the executive branch).
35. See THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT (2004).
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the society’s principal accountability vehicle. For example, they perform
accountability functions—such as revealing how anti-terrorism efforts
were conducted and forcing the government to present legal justifications
for that conduct. I examine the extensive limits on the ability of these suits
to perform that role as well as the possibility that those limits may be
relaxed.
Part IV asks why the legal system imposes such severe constraints. I
consider two explanations. First, the limits flow from underlying concerns
about the ability of the tort suit to serve broad goals of examination and
evaluation of governmental policy, particularly when the imposition of
constitutional restrictions is at stake. This is, at best, a partial explanation. I
offer a complementary one: the general limits on the constitutional tort suit
apply with particular force in the context of the war on terror. Concerns of
judicial deference to the political branches are at their highest when
national security is at issue. These concerns limit the courts’ normal ability
to examine individual assertions of rights, let alone to function as bodies of
national inquiry.
The Article concludes that reverse war on terror suits are, at best, a
default approach. There is a serious question whether they should, or
should be expected to, play the role of America’s primary truth and
reconciliation vehicle.
II. THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION THAT WASN’T
The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission to examine the Bush
administration’s anti-terrorism efforts has had a somewhat checkered
history. The concept of a commission appears to have been formally
launched by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in a speech at Georgetown
University on February 9, 2009.36 He called for “a reconciliation process
and truth commission,” whose “straightforward mission would be to find
the truth.”37 The truth about what was not clear. Senator Leahy invoked
both anti-terrorism efforts—“warrantless wiretapping [and] torture”—and
broader issues such as “politicized hiring at the Department of Justice.”38
Although Representative John Conyers (D-MI) filed legislation in the
House “[t]o establish a national commission on presidential war powers
and civil liberties,”39 the focus has been on Senator Leahy’s efforts. Rather
than file a bill, Senator Leahy apparently hoped to drum up public and
legislative support for the idea before proceeding with it. His initial efforts
fell flat. After a March hearing that was something of a farce, the
Washington Post reported that “[t]hings aren’t looking so good for the
36. Leahy, supra note 4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Getting to the Truth Through a Nonpartisan Commission of Inquiry: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy)
[hereinafter Truth Hearing].
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Truth Commission.”40 At one point, Senator Leahy’s strategy seemed
reduced to circulating an online petition via YouTube.41
Whether this uncertain trumpet is a partisan one might initially seem
open to debate. After all, Senator Leahy evoked a nonpartisan commission
that would seek “a mutual understanding of what went wrong and . . . learn
from it,”42 and insisted that his goal is not “vengeance, [but] a fair-minded
pursuit of what actually happened.”43 But he has had a hard time cloaking
his real goal: exposing the fundamentally evil nature of the Bush
administration through “accountability for what has been a dangerous and
disastrous diversion from American law and values.”44 Blogging in the
Huffington Post, the Senator minced no words: “We have just emerged
from a time when White House officials often acted as if they were above
the law. That was wrong and must be fully exposed so it never happens
again.”45 The post is replete with references to Bush administration
“abuses” and “misdeeds.”46 The Bush administration represents “eight
corrosive years,” a “dark chapter in American history . . . .”47 The
commission’s role would be to provide an “understanding of the failures of
the recent past, so we do not repeat them in the future.”48
As of this writing, the proposal seems dead in the water. There are three
principal reasons. The first is the fundamental ambivalence between the
inquiry model and the retributive model. The movement for the
commission had a strong tilt toward the latter, which made it impossible to
view the proposal as one for an objective inquiry that could garner support
from all sides of the political spectrum. Even leaders of Senator Leahy’s
own party were not interested in a witch hunt. There is a second reason
why the proposal has lost whatever luster it may have had. Many of the
policies that the commission would investigate are still in place. As
Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote in The New Republic four months after
President Obama’s inauguration, “[t]he new administration has copied
most of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only
a bit.”49 Each month brings new revelations of continuity on matters
40. Dana Milbank, Facing the Cold, Hard Truth, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2009, at A3. “Chief
Pursuer of Truth Patrick Leahy cut a lonely figure yesterday as he tried to persuade the Senate
Judiciary Committee to endorse his plan for . . . a commission to probe the Bush administration’s
treatment of suspected terrorists.” Id.
41. See, e.g., Bush Truth Commission, http://www.bushtruthcommission.com (last visited
Oct. 23, 2010).
42. Truth Hearing, supra note 39.
43. Leahy, supra note 4.
44. Id.
45. Patrick Leahy, A Truth Commission to Investigate Bush-Cheney Administration Abuses,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2009, 2:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-patrick-leahy/atruth-commission-to-inv_b_166461.html.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Jack Goldsmith, The Cheney Fallacy, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2009, 12:00 AM),
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ranging from “extraordinary rendition” to the executive power to detain.50
This continuity is striking, even given the possibility that later Bush
administration policies represented a retreat from the initial hard line. A
third reason why the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission did not
take hold in the United States is that the South African model rested on
radically different preconditions from inquiry into the Bush
administration’s anti-terrorism policies.51 In sum, Senator Leahy’s proposal
is unlikely to go anywhere.
III. CIVIL LIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY—THE PROS AND CONS
A. Liability as an Accountability Mechanism
1. The Concept of Accountability
Discussions of examining Bush-era policies, whether through a
commission or some other vehicle, inevitably involve calls for
“accountability.”52 Although the term is widely used, it is not easily
defined. One analyst refers to it as “elusive and controversial, with
theoretical debates under way almost constantly.”53 Nonetheless, there are
common themes to most discussions. As Dean Martha Minow puts it,
“[a]ccountability . . . means being answerable to authority that can mandate
desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches identified
obligations.”54 Professor Robert Gregory offers the following helpful
elaboration:
Because accountability concerns are most commonly apparent
when public power and authority have been abused or
misused the term tends to have negative connotations. It is
more likely to be used in public discourse when consequences
flow from actions or inactions that are generally considered to
be deleterious to the polity as a whole or to particular groups
or individuals within it. . . . [P]eople frequently express
concerns over accountability when they believe there has been
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy.
50. E.g., Editorial, Obama’s Kangaroo Courts, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 2009, at A12
(criticizing continued use of military tribunals).
51. Balkin, supra note 7.
52. E.g., Editorial, Impunity or Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at A40; Editorial,
Rendition, Torture and Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A22.
53. Paul G. Thomas, Accountability: Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
549, 549 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2003). For a helpful application of accountability
concepts to a particular situation, see Ryan M. Scoville, Note, Toward an Accountability-Based
Definition of “Mercenary,” 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 541, 562–81 (2006).
54. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003).
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none or too little of ‘it’. What is usually meant is that certain
persons or organizations are illegitimately evading at least one
of three things, if not all three: their need to explain events
and circumstances; their own complicity in them; or blame
and sanction for that complicity. Thus, accountability is
identified with the demand that when things go wrong, ‘heads
should roll’.55
What does the concept mean in practice? In an important article,
Professor Kathleen Clark develops a “process of accountability [with] four
distinct stages.”56 The first stage is “informing,” in which “the accountor
provides information relating to its conduct.”57 “The second stage is
justification, where the accountor attempts to provide a justification for its
conduct.58 The third stage is [an] evaluation, in which” that justification is
examined and judged.59 “[T]he final stage is rectification,” a process that
can lead to “a penalty or [other] remedy” if the justification is inadequate.60
Rectification might take the form of “incapacitation” for future office
holding, “deterrence” through punishment, “compensation” to those
harmed, and “symbolic expression” authoritatively declaring the
malfeasance and why it was wrong.61 Not all accountability mechanisms
can lead to all four stages.62 Although I find Professor Clark’s analysis
extremely helpful, it may be desirable to separate the fourth stage into three
sub-components: compensation, deterrence (whether of the offending
official or future ones), and general guidance.63
2. Civil Suits as Accountability Mechanisms
The civil suit can lead to all of the stages. Indeed, there is mounting
evidence that the suits generated by the war on terror are intended to, and
might, serve as accountability mechanisms. A number of high profile suits
have been filed, naming as defendants present and former officials at all
levels, including the (former) Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, a

55. Robert Gregory, Accountability in Modern Government, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 557, 558 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2003); see also Robert M. Chesney,
National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1417–18 (2009) (discussing the
importance of accountability to third parties on “decisionmakers who are aware that their judgments
will be reviewed by an outsider”).
56. Clark, supra note 34, at 361.
57. Id. (formatting removed).
58. Id. at 362 (formatting removed).
59. Id. (formatting removed).
60. Id. (formatting removed).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For Professor Clark, this is a broad category that can include “symbolic expression” as
well as authoritative judgment as to legality. Id.
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former top Justice Department official, and senior military officials.64
Grievances include unconstitutional detention,65 unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, “extraordinary rendition” leading to torture,66
and legal advice that set in motion unconstitutional conduct. 67 Plaintiffs
certainly assert constitutional torts leading to serious injuries, but
compensation may not always be the “stage” of accountability that most
concerns them. Jose Padilla sued John Yoo for $1 in damages based on the
constitutional injuries allegedly caused by Yoo’s legal advice.68 Canadian
citizen Maher Arar has already received over $10 million from the
Canadian government for its part in his extraordinary rendition.69
Lawyers close to the suits see them as a chance to force Bush
administration practices into the open. As the Associated Press reported:
“Critics of George W. Bush’s administration see the recent actions of the
courts as a chance to wring a measure of accountability from the Bush
White House — at a time when Obama expresses reluctance to look
backward and Congress has shown little appetite for investigating the
past.”70 Academic observers of the lawsuits see them the same way.
Professor David Zaring has examined “[t]he high-profile policy-directed
tort suit.”71 In his view, “[t]hese suits are more symbolic than likely to
succeed, in that they rely not on the verdict, but on the ability to make a
claim against a policy-maker.”72 “[L]itigants may not expect the courts to
award them damages as much as they hope to remind the public that senior
government officials have blessed an extraordinary rendition program,
written opinions on tough interrogation techniques, or outed a covert
agent.”73 Professor Peter Margulies views them as a form of “crossover
advocacy.”74
All of these observers see the reverse war on terror lawsuits as
accountability mechanisms. Application of Professor Clark’s concept of
stages of accountability helps prove the point. “Informing” certainly
64. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
65. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98).
66. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563.
67. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
68. First Amended Complaint at 19–21, Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No.
3:08–cv–00035), 2008 WL 2433172.
69. See Editorial, A National Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A30 (indicating the
amount of Canada’s offered settlement with Arar); Editorial, The Unfinished Case of Maher Arar,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A26 (discussing the Canadian government’s treatment of Arar).
70. Mark Sherman, Ex-Bush Officials Face Lawsuits over Their Actions, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 29, 2009, 2009 WLNR 19286421 (emphasis added).
71. David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313,
339 (2009).
72. Id. at 335.
73. Id.
74. Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies
in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2009).
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occurs, even though in the initial phase of civil litigation it is not the
accountor (the defendant) who provides the information. The plaintiff—
who might be viewed as the account-holder—does so through his or her
complaint. Of course, the accountor may be forced, through discovery, to
amplify the available information. But, even at the complaint stage, one
version of the accountor’s conduct becomes public. Professor Clark’s
second stage of “justification” does not usually happen right away. The
defendant will almost certainly assert non-merits defenses such as
immunity, state secrets, or failure to satisfy cause of action requirements
such as those required for a Bivens claim.75 Some of these defenses may
involve a degree of justification—for example, an immunity defense
contending that the asserted conduct did not violate a constitutional right,
or, at least, a clearly established one.76 Of course, if the case proceeds,
merits defenses will usually involve justification. A judgment on the merits
will normally involve an evaluation. Even judicial resolution of non-merits
defenses may involve a good deal of evaluation. As for the rectification
stages, much depends on whether a judgment is reached and what it is. An
ultimate judgment on the merits could lead to compensation, deterrence,
and guidance.
B. An Initial Theoretical Foundation—Marbury
The numerous obstacles they face call into serious question the
practical value of civil suits as accountability mechanisms. But as a
theoretical matter, any defense of civil suits as an accountability
mechanism can rely on the ultimate trump card in American public law
discourse: Marbury v. Madison.77 Perhaps the most important quote in that
highly quotable case is Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration that:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of
government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the
king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and
he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.78
Marbury’s grievance was against the government. He sued a government
official to remedy it, and Marshall made it clear that such suits are at the
core of the judicial role. The reference to English practice is telling: if
absolute monarchs submit themselves to that duty, the officials of a
republic should a fortiori do so.
In a spirited defense of the Bivens constitutional tort action—the
75. See Brown, supra note 16, at 883–86 (discussing problem of “special factors” exception
to Bivens).
76. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, supra note 18, at 1163.
77. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
78. Id. at 163.
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archetype of the reverse war on terror suit—Professor Susan Bandes
invokes the Marbury principle as follows:
Conceptually, though not chronologically, Bivens is a short
step from Marbury. To uphold the rights of individuals before
the Court, the Court must prevent encroachment on those
rights by the political branches. More than a century and a
half after Marbury, Bivens ratified judicial enforcement of the
limits on governmental excess. The use of the Constitution as
a sword; the willingness to enforce limits, which is the
animating principle behind Bivens, rests on the notion of
positive checks on government espoused in Marbury. It is
inconsistent with a version of the separation of powers
doctrine which views the tripartite functions as sharply
separated, and the judiciary as passive in the face of
incursions by the political branches.79
Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer elaborate on the
distinction between the Marbury principle of a remedy for every right and
“[a]nother principle, whose focus is more structural, [that] demands a
system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally
within the bounds of law.”80 Of course, an Article III-based system that
requires a case or controversy (in particular, a plaintiff who has suffered
harm) often blends what Fallon and Meltzer call “providing effective
remediation to individual victims” with “ensuring governmental
faithfulness to law.”81 Reverse war on terror suits—given the fact that they
are tort actions—seek to further both goals.
C. Limits on the Reverse War on Terror Suit
1. The Cause of Action Problem
Most civil suits by victims of the war on terror will be constitutional
torts brought under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.82 Bivens permits plaintiffs who assert
constitutional violations to proceed directly against the relevant federal
officials despite the lack of a statutory authorization analogous to § 1983.83
However, Bivens has been a controversial doctrine since its promulgation

79. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 311 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
80. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991).
81. Id. at 1789.
82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
83. See Brown, supra note 16, at 869–70 (discussing parallel nature of the two remedies).
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in 197184 and has recently seemed to be in sharp decline, almost to the
point of being “disfavored.”85 It is, to a substantial extent, an exercise in
judicial policymaking,86 and policies can cut more than one way. From the
beginning, the Court indicated that a Bivens action might not proceed if (1)
a case presented “special factors counselling [sic] hesitation”;87 or (2)
Congress had declared that constitutional plaintiffs seeking damages from
a federal officer “may not recover money damages from the agents, but
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view
of Congress.”88 For the last two decades, the Court has been cutting back
substantially on the availability of Bivens suits, and the “special factors”
doctrine has played the major role in Bivens’ decline.89 Reverse war on
terror suits bristle with such questions as judicial deference to the
executive in matters of military affairs and national security. These are
precisely the sorts of questions that seem to constitute “special factors
counselling [sic] hesitation.” The point has not been lost on the lower
courts, which have tended to dismiss war on terror Bivens actions on
precisely this ground.90 As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not
addressed the matter.91 A striking example of the attitude of, and divisions
within, the lower federal courts can be found in the Second Circuit’s en
banc opinion in Arar v. Ashcroft.92 Arar was a damages action against
high-level federal officials based on injuries the plaintiff claimed to have
84. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 79, at 293–94 (discussing controversial nature of doctrine).
85. See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2007).
86. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399, 403–04 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
policymaking nature of remedial decisions).
87. Id. at 396 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 397.
89. In Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007), the Court examined the alternative remedies
available but based its conclusion of no Bivens remedy primarily on special factors analysis. Id. at
549–62. Alternative remedies played an important role in such early cases as Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980), but the Court’s emphasis during the retrenchment period of the 1980s
shifted to special factors and sometimes conflated the two exceptions by treating the existence of an
alternate remedy as a special factor. Alternate remedy analysis resurfaced in the Court’s most recent
denial of a Bivens action in Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1850 (2010). Hui involved a statute
that provided that in damages actions against Public Health Service personnel, the Federal Tort
Claims Act remedy against the United States is exclusive. A unanimous Court treated the case as
governed by the plain language of the statute, which it read as providing immunity from individual
suits. Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a Bivens claim was thus denied. The Court did not engage in
analysis of the alternative remedy exception, stating that “[w]e express no opinion as to whether a
Bivens remedy is otherwise available in these circumstances, as the question is not presented in this
case.” Id. at 1852 n.6. The Court of Appeals had engaged in an extensive consideration of the issue.
See Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 688–700 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Hui v.
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010).
90. E.g., In re Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 107.
91. The Court’s most recent action was the denial of certiorari in Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct.
3409 (2010), discussed infra text accompanying notes 93–102.
92. 585 F.3d 559, 563–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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suffered as a result of his “extraordinary rendition” to Syria.93 His claims,
based primarily on a Bivens theory, were largely rejected by the district
court94 and a circuit panel majority.95 By a 7-4 margin, the circuit court
affirmed the rejection en banc,96 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.97
Given the denial of certiorari, this decision stands as that of the highest
ranking court to address these issues. The en banc decision is a remarkable
discussion not only of Bivens and related issues but of the broader question
of the role of the courts in the war on terror.
The majority stated that “[a]lthough this action is cast in terms of a
claim for money damages against the defendants in their individual
capacities, it operates as a constitutional challenge to policies promulgated
by the executive.”98 The theme of damage suits as, in effect, suits against
the government to challenge policy is an important conceptual
underpinning of the opinion. Its major ground, however, was the limited
competence of courts in areas of “foreign policy and national security.”99
The latter, more familiar, argument is a recurring theme in national security
litigation.100 It is, of course, in some tension with Marbury and with the
view of courts as vindicators of rights in all contexts.101 The majority
recognized this view but sidestepped the issue by invoking the superior
competence of Congress to decide such matters as the availability of
judicial remedies for claims such as Arar’s.102
As for Bivens issues, Arar arose after a prolonged period of Supreme
Court hostility toward the constitutional tort action. In 2007, the Court
stated:
[W]e have . . . []held that any freestanding damages remedy
for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a
judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional
guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what
other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest, and
in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy
unjustified.103
The Court caused some confusion when it opposed extending Bivens to

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id. at 565–67 (detailing allegations).
Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2008).
Arar, 585 F.3d at 582.
Arar v. Aschcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409, 3409 (2010).
Arar, 585 F.3d at 574.
Id. at 575.
E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579, 585–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
E.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (majority opinion).
Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–81.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
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new “contexts.”104 The meaning of “context” was uncertain.105 The Arar
majority defined context as a “potentially recurring scenario that has
similar legal and factual components.”106 It viewed the context in Arar as
extraordinary rendition; the existence of this new context triggered the
“special factors” inquiry.107 The court was quick to find such factors. It
again emphasized the presence of national security issues and lack of
judicial competence to deal with them.108 Indeed, it viewed the exception
as triggered whenever special factors were identified—thus rejecting a
balancing approach109—and stated that the resultant exercise of judicial
discretion was appropriate whenever hesitation was counseled, not
required.110
Arar appears to be a negative decision in its attitude toward, and
resolution of, the Bivens remedy. The majority certainly thought its result
was consistent with both the results and reasoning of Supreme Court
precedents since the 1980s denying the remedy. However, one
commentator has contended that the en banc opinion included “one
analytical move that could actually prove beneficial to plaintiffs.”111 The
argument is that following the Second Circuit approach would require a
court to find the existence of a new context before examining whether
special factors (or an adequate alternate remedy) exist. Under this view, it
might be sufficient for a plaintiff to show the existence of a Bivens
precedent that granted protection to the interests or right asserted.112 Such a
finding would mean that the plaintiff did not seek an extension of Bivens to
a new context; thus, it would be unnecessary to reach the exceptions. Hope
and creativity spring eternal, but this analysis—turning an anti-plaintiff
decision into a pro-plaintiff one—seems highly vulnerable on at least two
grounds. First, the meaning of context is still uncertain. Moreover, even if
a Bivens remedy had been previously recognized in a particular context, the
presence of war on terror factors might still counsel hesitation. The latter
contention was the key to Arar.
Indeed, after Arar, it is no easier than before to answer the question of
what constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation in a war on terror
Bivens case. The Second Circuit opinion apparently rejects a broad
approach—such as viewing the entire war on terror as a new context that
constitutes a special factor113—in favor of a narrower approach that
104. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001).
105. See Brown, supra note 16, at 855–62.
106. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 574–76.
109. Id. at 573–74.
110. Id. at 574.
111. Recent Cases, Second Circuit Holds that Alleged Victim of Extraordinary Rendition Did
Not State a Bivens Claim. — Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2010).
112. Id. at 1793.
113. See Brown, supra note 16, at 888 (discussing treating the war on terror in its entirety as a
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identifies specific aspects of the war on terror—such as extraordinary
rendition—as new contexts which may present special factors.114 However,
it finds special factors—such as deference to the political branches—that
can apply to any aspect of the war on terror. This seemingly contextspecific opinion appears to camouflage a general approach.
Without Bivens, most reverse war on terror suits will not survive the
pleading stage. The Bivens debate raises the question of whether the
special factors exception should serve as a general, almost inflexible
obstacle or whether a more differentiated response is desirable at the
threshold stage. The district court’s initial opinion in Padilla v. Yoo115
illustrates the latter possibility.116 Yoo had been a high-level Justice
Department official in the Bush administration. Padilla’s principal claim
was that Yoo’s legal advice had laid the groundwork for Padilla’s
mistreatment.117 In denying a motion to dismiss, the district court utilized a
fact-specific analysis to reject special factors arguments centered on
national security. It emphasized that Padilla’s complaint did not involve
battlefield issues or relations with foreign governments.118 It thus was able
to distinguish the Arar lower court reasoning that was vindicated on appeal
and en banc.
The Arar dissenters sounded many of the usual themes, including the
role of courts in protecting individual liberties even when intrusion into
national security might occur.119 The New York Times took a strong
editorial stance, characterizing the denial of certiorari as “disgraceful.”120
Not surprisingly, the dissenters disagreed with the majority on the
application of the Bivens doctrine, denying that the case represented a new
context and treating special factors as a limited exception. The dissenters
saw Bivens as a blunt instrument in reverse war on terror litigation—
“barring all . . . plaintiffs at the courtroom door without further inquiry.”121
Interestingly, they suggested use of the state secrets privilege,122 discussed
below,123 as a possible differentiating mechanism to allow further
proceedings in those Bivens actions in which damages of intrusion on
national security were minimal. This would be a surprising turn of events.
The privilege—particularly its use by the Bush administration—has been
reviled by those who want to see more reverse war on terror suits.124
special factor).
114. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572.
115. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
116. Id. at 1019–20.
117. See id. at 1014–17.
118. Id. at 1025.
119. Arar, 585 F.3d at 612 (Parker, J., dissenting).
120. Editorial, No Price to Pay for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A30.
121. Arar, 585 F.3d at 603 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 605–11.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 283–302.
124. Editorial, Unraveling Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A30 (criticizing Bush
administration use of privilege, and stressing importance of civil suits for examining misconduct
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An alternative route for some of the claims that might be presented in a
Bivens action is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).125 Indeed,
the potential use of RFRA in suits such as those discussed in this Article is
emerging as a cutting edge issue in reverse war on terror litigation. RFRA
is a complex statute with a complex history.126 The most pertinent part
provides as follows:
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or
defense under this section shall be governed by the general
rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.127
This statute has several advantages for potential plaintiffs. It overcomes
the cause of action problem by providing one. Many persons with
conditions of confinement claims will be able to plausibly allege that their
confinement included denial of religious materials, interference with
prayers, or other practices that “burden . . . exercise of religion.”128 They
will certainly try to go beyond obvious burdens to broader issues of
religious discrimination. Moreover, RFRA appears to represent an example
of rights conferred by statute. It does not require that the person claiming

and giving remedy to victims).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
126. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussing history and bases
of act and striking down its application to state and local governments).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
128. E.g., Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (asserting condition
of confinement claims under the Constitution, international law, and RFRA), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 1013 (2009).
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its protection assert a constitutional right.129 At the moment, it is unclear
whether Boumediene’s extension of habeas corpus rights to Guantanamo
applies to other constitutional rights.130 Nor is it clear whether
Boumediene, whatever its principle, applies beyond Guantanamo.131 It may
well be the case, however, that this uncertainty is irrelevant to a RFRA
plaintiff asserting a statutory right.
Reverse war on terror plaintiffs have begun to grasp the potential of
RFRA and to use it in their suits. For example, Jose Padilla alleged that
John Yoo’s legal advice and direct personal involvement in the
formulation of anti-terrorism policies—as well as his direct involvement in
aspects of Padilla’s detention—“proximately and foreseeably led to the
abuses suffered by [him].”132 The claimed deprivations included the
following: “denial of any mechanism to tell time in order to ascertain the
time for prayer in keeping with the Muslim practice” and “denial of access
to the Koran for most of his detention.”133
As part of an extensive order largely denying Yoo’s motion to dismiss,
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that
a RFRA claim based on these denials could proceed.134 The key issue was
whether “RFRA allows for individual capacity suits for money damages
against federal officers.”135 The court relied in part on other lower court
holdings that it does.136 The court also found in RFRA a clear tracking of
the language of § 1983.137 District court decisions such as Padilla v. Yoo
might seem to give the green light to a potentially expansive use of RFRA
in conditions of confinement cases. There is, however, a significant
obstacle: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s
two decisions in Rasul v. Myers,138 adopting a narrow definition of the
word “person” in RFRA, one which excludes nonresident aliens.139
Rasul was a damages action brought by former Guantanamo detainees,
based on the conditions of their confinement, against a range of officials.

129. See Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 366–72
(D.N.J. 2004) (discussing statutory and constitutional dimensions of RFRA).
130. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 529.
131. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that
Boumediene applies beyond Guantanamo), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
132. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
133. Id. at 1014.
134. Id. at 1038–39.
135. Id. at 1039.
136. Id. (citing Lepp v. Gonzales, No. C–05–0566 VRW, 2005 WL 1867723, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 2, 2005); Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373 (D.N.J.
2004)).
137. Id.
138. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008),
on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
139. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 671–72; Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S.Ct. 1013 (2009).
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Their causes of action were based on Bivens, the Alien Tort Statute,140 and
RFRA. The court initially held that “Guantanamo detainees lack
constitutional rights because they are aliens without property or presence in
the United States.”141 The court based this view on Supreme Court
precedent and its own recent denial of a detainee’s Suspension Clause
claim in Boumediene v. Bush.142 This reasoning carried over to the holding
that nonresident aliens were not “persons” as that term is used in RFRA.143
The court viewed RFRA, as originally enacted, as protecting only
“persons” with First Amendment rights.144 Since the amended version of
the statute still used the term “person,” the court concluded that Congress
still intended it to exclude those persons who could not assert
constitutional rights.145
The holding in Rasul is surprising. It ignores the normal, plain meaning
of the term person.146 It also ignores the fact that the revised version of
RFRA no longer defines the “exercise of religion” by reference to the First
Amendment.147 The Supreme Court’s reversal of Boumediene148 cast
further doubt on Rasul, one of the cases on which it was based. Indeed,
shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated Rasul and remanded it to the
District of Columbia Circuit “for further consideration in light of
Boumediene.”149 Undaunted, the circuit court reaffirmed its prior holding
as to all claims, including RFRA.150
The District of Columbia Circuit is, of course, correct in that the
applicability of Boumediene to constitutional rights beyond habeas—
whether at Guantanamo or on a broader basis—is an open question. I have
argued that in the Bivens context the Court’s receptivity to habeas claims
may not extend to substantive claims.151 As for constitutional extraterritoriality, the Boumediene majority was careful to leave standing and
distinguish precedents such as Johnson v. Eisenstrager.152 RFRA claims
are statutory, however. One could read Boumediene as reinforcing the
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also infra text accompanying notes 166–84.
141. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 663.
142. 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
143. RFRA states, in part, that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006).
144. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 668–72.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 673–76 (Brown, J., concurring).
147. But see id. at 675–76 (recognizing broadening of scope of rights but concluding that it did
not broaden the range of individuals concerned).
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
149. Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763, 763 (2008).
150. Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
Rasul’s treatment of claims under the Alien Tort Statute is discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 166–86.
151. Brown, supra note 16, at 897–900.
152. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726 (rejecting the reasoning of Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339
U.S. 763 (1950)).
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Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Rasul v. Bush153 that statutory habeas
corpus was available at Guantanamo.154 Taken together, the two cases
emphasize the importance of the enforceability of rights at Guantanamo. In
Rasul, a receptive lower court could have allowed the RFRA claim to
proceed without reaching the difficult question of constitutional scope.
However, in December 2009, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rasul
v. Myers,155 thus leaving intact, for now, the circuit court’s holding on all
issues, including RFRA. This holding does not affect claims by U.S.
citizens or claims arising within the United States.
RFRA has its limits, even if the District of Columbia Circuit’s negative
construction is not followed. Not all asserted victims of the war on terror
will be able to assert a religious dimension to their claims. I will briefly
consider two alternative sources of a cause of action—one narrow, one
potentially broad. Plaintiffs asserting torture by the government will seek
to invoke the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).156 A principal goal of
that statute is to ensure that an official who “subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual.”157
Not only does the Act provide an express cause of action, but it also
defines “torture” quite broadly.158 The statute is limited, however, to acts
committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation.”159 In Arar,160 the Second Circuit panel, in affirming a
district court ruling, held that this limitation precluded a TVPA action
against American officials, even when the plaintiff alleged that they had
worked closely with Syrian officials in an “extraordinary rendition.”161 The
court issued what seems to be a per se ruling that the American officials
would have to act under the “control or influence”162 of a foreign state, to
the point that their power could be seen as “derived” from that state.163 The
en banc majority agreed, stating that in order to state a claim under the
TVPA, Arar would have had to allege that the defendant officials
“possessed power under Syrian law.”164 The court rejected the dissent’s
argument from § 1983 precedents dealing with the possibility that nonstate actors’ involvement with state officials turns the formers’ conduct
into state action.165 The majority’s view—that federal officials act under
153. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
154. Id. at 484.
155. 130 S. Ct. 1013, 1014 (2009) (mem.).
156. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 notes (2006)).
157. Id. § 2(a)(1).
158. See id. § 3(b)(1).
159. Id. § 2(a).
160. 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on reh’g, 585 F. 3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
161. Arar, 532 F.3d at 176 (discussing problem of joint action).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568.
165. Id. at 568 n.3.
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color of federal law even when they cooperate closely with foreign
officials—seems a more accurate description of the relevant legal
relationships. Thus, it is unlikely that the TVPA will overcome cause of
action problems in reverse war on terror suits. There is, however, a broader
possibility for some plaintiffs.
Non-citizen claimants can attempt to assert their non-constitutional
claims through the seemingly broad vehicle of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS),166 which provides that the “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”167 This
statute solves the cause of action problem, and its coverage of grievances
governed by treaties and international law could get many plaintiffs past
the pleading stage. Some of these complaints could also embrace
constitutional claims. This may be the case notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain—the foundational ATS
case—that “federal courts should not recognize [private] claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 18thCentury paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”168
The (perhaps insurmountable) obstacle to any use of the ATS is the
Westfall Act,169 which governs generally non-constitutional tort actions
against federal employees or officials. The Act provides:
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant
employee was acting within the scope of his office or
employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim
arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such
claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an
action against the United States under the provisions of this
title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be
substituted as the party defendant.170
This language triggers the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),171 which
contains an exhaustion requirement.172 This requirement proved fatal to the
ATS claims of the former detainees in Rasul brought against Defense
Department and military officials. The District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed dismissal of these claims because “[t]he record is devoid . . . of
any suggestion that they complied with any of the procedures governing
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
167. Id.
168. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
169. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2 (2006); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 2671, 2671 notes, 2674, 2679, 2679 notes (2006)).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006).
171. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006).
172. Id. § 2675(a).
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the filing of an administrative claim with DoD or one of the military
departments.”173 Even assuming exhaustion is satisfied, the FTCA contains
a number of exceptions that can bar relief for reverse war on terror
plaintiffs. These include, for example, activities that took place in a foreign
country174 and those that involve exercise of a “discretionary” function.175
The key point in the suit thus becomes the validity of the Attorney
General’s scope of employment certification. Courts will entertain a
challenge to a certification, although it is prima facie evidence of scope of
employment.176 The plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the certification.
Rasul shows how onerous this burden can be. The plaintiffs argued that
torture cannot be within the scope of employment.177 Relying on both
precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Agency,178 the District of
Columbia Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court’s
decision.179
The court of appeals did not focus on the military, war on terror
context, but it relied heavily on scope of employment cases primarily from
the private sector. For example, a deliveryman acted within the scope of
his employment “when he assaulted and raped a customer.”180 A
laundromat employee acted “within [the] scope of his employment when
he shot [a] customer during [a] dispute over removal of clothes from [a]
washing machine.”181 These disputes—in which the employer was held
liable—arose out of the conduct of the employer’s business. By analogy,
“the detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants is a
central part of the defendants’ duties as military officers charged with
winning the war on terror.”182 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
emphasized that the Restatement declares that “criminal conduct is not per
se outside the scope of employment.”183 One can question this aspect of
Rasul on at least two levels. The plaintiff’s principal claim was based on
173. Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006).
175. Id. § 2680(a); see also, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 715, 742–50 (2006). Professor Richard Henry Seamon concludes that “precedent strongly
suggests that the formulation of the policies that have led to the torture of suspected terrorists
involves the kind of discretion that the discretionary function clause protects. The policies are
‘susceptible to’ considerations of public safety, foreign intelligence needs, military strategy, and
foreign relations.” Id. at 749.
176. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 655 (citing Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d
659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
177. Id. at 656.
178. E.g., id. at 655–56 (applying Restatement factors).
179. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 656–61; Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
180. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 657; see Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
181. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 657–58 (citing Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404, 409 (D.C.
1981)).
182. Id. at 658.
183. Id. at 659.
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torture. Torture is a violation of fundamental values recognized in statutes,
treaties, and, by implication, the Constitution.184 As Professor David Cole
puts it, “[t]orture is different. International and U.S. law provide that
torture is never justifiable, under any circumstances, for any reason, in war
or peace.”185 For example, a “necessity defense” cannot be interposed
against a claim of torture.186 On a different level, one can question the use
of cases in which the result was to impose liability on the employer as a
means to let individual defendants escape liability and remit plaintiffs to
the quagmire of the FTCA.
Up to this point, cause of action analysis has focused on the role of the
judiciary, both in creating and defining the constitutional tort action in the
Bivens context and in interpreting the statutory causes of action created by
RFRA, TVPA, and ATS. However, Congress’s role may become more
important. It might, for example, create private causes of action with more
specific connections to the war on terror than these three statutes. A section
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides for civil liability if it
has been violated.187 In an important ruling on the National Security
Agency’s program on warrantless electronic surveillance, a federal district
court awarded damages under this section, although it treated the statute as
a waiver of sovereign immunity.188 Thus, damages were awarded against
the government but not against individual officials.189 Congress might also
act to restrict whatever causes of action are available. It has attempted to
eliminate jurisdiction over complaints by “enemy combatants”190 and has
provided defenses to claims arising out of interrogation practices.191 Given
these steps, it seems unlikely that Congress will act further to ease the
cause of action problems described above. As noted, these problems can
prevent a potential plaintiff from even bringing a constitutional, or similar,
tort action in the war on terror context. Professor Margulies observes that
“[i]n decisions that appear most likely to be influential, courts have
displayed categorical deference, precluding Bivens actions and encouraging
officials’ unwise risk-seeking behavior.”192 Moreover, cause of action
184. See Seamon, supra note 175, at 716 n.1 (citing domestic and international law, including
the Detainee Treatment Act, which provides that, “‘No individual in the custody or under the
physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location,
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.’”).
185. THE TORTURE MEMOS 7 (David Cole ed., 2009).
186. See id. at 23–24 (discussing “necessity” and “self–defense” defenses).
187. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2006).
188. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1193 (N.D.
Cal. 2010).
189. Id. at 1202–03.
190. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441(e) (Supp. III 2009)).
191. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1 (Supp. II 2008)).
192. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security
Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 221 (2010).
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problems are only the first of many limits.193
2. Immunity
The doctrine of immunity is controversial. If the defendant invokes it
successfully, the suit is over. Critics have labeled recent immunity
developments as a “twentieth century betrayal of founding principles.”194
Yet, “it is widely believed that some degree of immunity for individual
officers is imperative.”195 The tension between immunity and Marbury is
particularly significant. For Professor Akhil Amar, it contradicts
Marbury’s “central tenet” that “every right . . . must have a remedy.”196
However, the Supreme Court majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,197—a
decision granting the President absolute immunity—saw the issue in a
different light: “[I]t is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a
remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong.”198 Besides immunity, the
Court noted the importance of denials of implied rights actions and denials
of Bivens remedies on special factors grounds.199 It also noted that
“Marbury . . . lost his case in the Supreme Court.”200
The obvious question that the existence of immunity poses is what
rationale is strong enough to blunt the thrust of Marbury. The Supreme
Court’s consistent answer to this question has been the need to ensure zeal
on the part of public officials when performance of their duties puts them
in conflict with citizens.201 Here is how the Court in Nixon described a
foundational 19th Century decision:
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English
cases at common law, the Court concluded that “[t]he
interests of the people” required a grant of absolute immunity
to public officers. In the absence of immunity, the Court
reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise their
discretion in a way “injuriously affect[ing] the claims of
particular individuals,” even when the public interest required
bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of “public policy
and convenience” therefore compelled a judicial recognition

193. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, supra note 18, at 1163 (concluding that,
“[D]etainees face daunting legal challenges to having their claims of wrongful detention, torture and
abuse heard in federal court.”).
194. Akil Reid Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Commentary, Executive Privileges and
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 709 (1995).
195. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 526 (5th ed. 2007).
196. Amar & Katyal, supra note 194, at 707.
197. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
198. Id. at 754 n.37.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 755 n.37.
201. E.g., id. at 753 n.32.
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of immunity from suits arising from official acts.202
Analytically, there are two forms of immunity: absolute and qualified.
The former is rare, however. Even those officials who have it—e.g.,
legislators, prosecutors, and judges—are only immune when sued for
functions that are part of the core of the office that creates the immunity in
the first place. For example, judges are immune for acts performed in their
judicial capacity.203 Society does not want them to be in fear of a suit by
the losing party. They are not immune, however, for administrative or
executive acts.204
Qualified, not absolute, immunity is the norm. Prior to 2009, the Court
required a two-step inquiry:
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has
alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see
Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right.
Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court
must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly
established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct
violated a clearly established constitutional right.205
The Court modified this inquiry in Pearson v. Callahan,206 making the
first step optional.207 It remains to be seen whether elimination of the first
step will impede the articulation of constitutional rights.208 The important
point is that the defendant’s immunity is defined by reference to his
perception of the plaintiff’s rights and whether that perception was
reasonable. Finally, immunity is often analyzed as a right the defendant
possesses separate and distinct from the merits—a right not to be tried at
all in certain cases.209 Denial of an immunity claim can be appealed at
once, under the “collateral order” doctrine.210
Qualified immunity has played an important role in the reverse war on
terror litigation. An important question has been the clarity with which the
plaintiff’s asserted rights were established at the time of violation.
202. Id. at 744–45 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896) (citations
omitted)).
203. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 195, at 534–37.
204. Id.
205. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009) (citations omitted) (citing Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
206. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
207. Id. at 821.
208. See id. at 819 (discussing role of first step).
209. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985).
210. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741–44 (1982) (discussing doctrine in
context of absolute immunity).
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Plaintiffs will often win this battle. In Iqbal v. Hasty,211 a classic conditions
of confinement case, the Second Circuit remarked:
[T]he exigent circumstances of the post-9/11 context do not
diminish the Plaintiff’s right not to be needlessly harassed and
mistreated in the confines of a prison cell by repeated strip
and body-cavity searches. This and other rights, such as the
right to be free from use of excessive force and not to be
subjected to ethnic or religious discrimination, were all
clearly established prior to 9/11 . . . .212
There may be rights, viewed as more at the margin, that were not
clearly established at the relevant time.213 The Pearson rule, permitting
omission of the inquiry as to whether a right exists at all, may slow
clarification of the existence of rights. For noncitizens complaining of
conduct outside the United States, the major immunity question will be
whether they possessed any constitutional rights and whether defendants
could have reasonably foreseen that they did.
If we assume that most of the suits under discussion here will be
brought against Bush-era officials for actions outside the United States, a
number of claims will be barred by qualified immunity. Of course, the
Boumediene rule might be extended to rights beyond habeas corpus and the
areas beyond Guantanamo.214 These developments would raise, in the
immunity context, the question of whether defendants should have
foreseen the rights despite the District of Columbia Circuit’s view in Rasul
that they could not.215 The Ninth Circuit has required a high degree of
foresight on the defendant official’s part, even though there were no
decisions squarely on point that would invalidate his conduct.216 In Al-Kidd
v. Ashcroft,217 the court noted the presence of dicta, decisions on analogous
issues, and the point that “the history and purposes of the Fourth
Amendment were known well before 2003.”218 Still, an important goal of
qualified immunity is that officials—whose zeal the system wants to
encourage—should not have to guess about the existence of rights. Rasul
will probably be followed by other courts, permitting numerous assertions
of qualified immunity in suits by aliens based on conduct outside the
211. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
212. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 159–60.
213. Id. at 167–68 (procedural due process rights prior to prison administrative segregation).
214. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009) (extending
Boumediene rule to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
215. Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“No reasonable government official would
have been on notice that plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights.”), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
216. See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W.
3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 970–71.
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United States. In the domestic war on terror context, Rasul’s utility to
defendant officials is less clear. John Yoo has said that it is of little
value.219 Thus, qualified immunity may be less of a problem for some
plaintiffs than cause of action issues.
Of course, the war on terror could cause the domestic rules to change.
This is certainly a context in which we want officials to act with zeal.
Front-line officers may have to make split-second decisions that could
affect thousands of lives. Higher-level officials may have to formulate
policies that run up against constitutional protections in order to adequately
investigate the terror threat.220 Thus, officials at all levels need freedom to
act. Even if current suits are only against Bush administration officials, the
law must seek to develop immunity doctrines that protect future
administrations as well. One of the rationales for immunity is the
importance of attracting individuals to government service without their
having to fear a constant barrage of suits for doing their duty.221 Moreover,
given the war on terror, federal officials may have a special need for
immunity that their state and local counterparts lack. Immunity is a judgemade doctrine, heavily driven by concerns of public policy.222 The big
question is whether the Court might formulate special rules for federal
officials engaged in the war on terror.
Any such effort to change the rules would be a step toward bifurcating
federal level immunity from that enjoyed by state and local officials. As
such, it would run counter to one of the fundamental tenets of immunity
law: that it is the same for federal and state officials. In Butz v.
Economou,223 the Supreme Court declared categorically that “we deem it
untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits
brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly
under the Constitution against federal officials.”224 The Court noted that
prior precedent had treated the two questions as interchangeable and
concluded that the immunity inquiry in both contexts should be guided by
the same policy considerations.225 In an excellent recent article on Bivens,
Professor James Pfander and his co-author David Baltmanis reinforce the
Butz parallelism in the following terms: persons who seek recourse from
the courts for violations of their rights by public officials should not
encounter different doctrines of immunity depending on the happenstance
of the level of government for which the official works.226
219. John Yoo, Terrorist Tort Travesty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at A13.
220. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (emphasizing importance of
freeing from litigation officials who are responding to a national security emergency).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744–45 (1982).
223. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
224. Id. at 504.
225. Id. at 503–04.
226. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 124–25 (2009).
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Things may not be so clear, however. Butz was a 5–4 decision.227 Four
Justices sharply disagreed with the majority and advocated “differing
standards of immunity.”228 For Justice William Rehnquist, “even a
moment’s reflection on the nature of the Bivens-type action and the
purposes of § 1983, as made abundantly clear in this Court’s prior cases,
supplies a compelling reason for distinguishing between the two different
situations.”229 He emphasized Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity in
the FTCA and argued that the federal government has greater supervisory
power over its own officials than it does over state officials.230 On a
conceptual level, different treatment of the immunity question might be
warranted by the fact that § 1983 is a statutory cause of action while
Bivens—the principal source of suits in which federal immunity issues will
arise—is entirely judge-made. Certainly, the Court has looked to the history
and purpose of § 1983 to resolve issues of state and local immunity.231 And
with respect to the availability of Bivens actions, it has developed a
significant doctrine of limitation—special factors counseling hesitation—
not present in the § 1983 context. It is true, despite these arguments, that
any move away from parallelism would be a big step. But the full effects of
the war on terror on the judicial role and judicial doctrines remain to be
seen.
If courts are willing to take this step, what might immunity doctrine
look like? One can find the suggestion that absolute immunity is
appropriate in the national security context.232 However, Mitchell v.
Forsyth233 appears to have put an end to this possibility. Although the
Mitchell Court was split in numerous ways, there seems little possibility of
a reconsideration of the prevailing opinion’s view that “[t]he danger that
high federal officials will disregard constitutional rights in their zeal to
protect the national security is sufficiently real to counsel against affording
such officials an absolute immunity.”234 The question will become how to
apply the current framework for qualified immunity to the special
circumstances of the war on terror. The current focus is on the defendant’s
knowledge of the plaintiff’s rights. In his book Not a Suicide Pact,235 Judge
Richard Posner considers the question of “how far civil liberties based on
the Constitution should be permitted to vary with the threat level.”236
227. Justice Byron White authored the majority opinion. Butz, 438 U.S. at 480.
228. Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 524–25.
231. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). But see Butz, 438 U.S. at 501–02
(majority opinion) (questioning emphasis on legislative creation of cause of action in determining
immunity).
232. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 538, 540–42 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
233. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
234. Id. at 523 (majority opinion).
235. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006).
236. Id. at 7.
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Posner advocates a balancing approach to determine the scope of
constitutional rights in emergency circumstances.237 Building on Posner, a
defendant official could argue that the emergency circumstances of the war
on terror rendered the plaintiff’s rights less “clearly established” than they
would have been in normal times.
An argument along these lines was advanced in the first Iqbal appeal to
the Second Circuit.238 On the issue of qualified immunity, some defendants
argued that “the post-9/11 context requires a different outcome.”239 They
contended that “even if the law was clearly established as to the existence
of a right claimed to have been violated, it was not clearly established in
the extraordinary circumstances of the 9/11 attack and its aftermath.”240 As
noted, the court rejected the argument both on the ground that the rights
were clearly established and on the ground that they “do not vary with the
surrounding circumstances.”241 Later in the Article, I will address the issue
of whether arguments of this sort can be put forward as substantive
defenses.242 I raise the point here both to underscore how closely entangled
immunity and merits issues can become and to note how defendants may
piggyback merits issues onto immunity denial appeals. John Yoo may be
right, for now, on the limited value of immunity. Still, defendants will win
some cases.243 Collateral appeals of immunity denials—coupled with
possible piggybacking of other issues244—could lead to long delays. And,
of course, given the uncertain reach of Boumediene, it seems almost certain
that Bush administration officials can claim immunity with respect to
claims by aliens based on actions arising outside the United States. In sum,
immunity is not a toothless tiger. It represents one more limit to the
availability of reverse war on terror suits.
3. The Shadow of Iqbal—Pleading, Supervisory Liability, and
Immunity Reinforced
Its 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal245 is widely regarded as one of the
Supreme Court’s most important rulings on pleading requirements under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.246 Its importance extends well
237. Id. at 9, 31, 35, 41.
238. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009).
239. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 159.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 159–60.
242. See infra Part III.C.3.
243. E.g., Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013
(2009).
244. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 548–49 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court’s “toothless” standard regarding issues that can be raised on interlocutory
appeals of immunity denials).
245. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
246. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits,
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beyond pleading, particularly for the civil suits discussed in this Article.
Iqbal was a reverse war on terror Bivens action. The plaintiff claimed that
after the September 11 attacks, federal officials adopted a policy of highly
restrictive detention of Arab Muslim men. Having been detained pursuant
to this policy, the plaintiff further alleged mistreatment of various sorts
including physical harm and interference with religious practices.247 He
sued both the high-level officials responsible for this policy and the lowerlevel officials who carried it out.248 He asserted constitutional claims under
Bivens and statutory claims of the sort discussed above,249 most of which
were dismissed.250 The case came before the Second Circuit on appeal
from a denial of a claim for qualified immunity. The appeals court cast the
immunity claim in the following terms:
[The] arguments with respect to qualified immunity fall into
several broad categories: (1) the Plaintiff's allegations do not
allege the violation of a clearly established right, (2) do not
allege sufficient personal involvement of the Defendants in
the challenged actions, (3) are too conclusory to overcome a
qualified immunity defense, and (4) the Defendants’ actions
were objectively reasonable. Permeating the Defendants’
assertion of a qualified immunity defense is the contention
that, however the defense might be adjudicated in normal
circumstances, the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack
created a context in which the defense must be assessed
differently and, from their standpoint, favorably.251
It denied virtually all of the immunity claims.252 At issue before the
Supreme Court were the immunity claims of two high ranking officials—
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller.253
The Court reversed the denials.254 Central to its resolution of the issue
was its understanding of the concept of supervisory liability. Plaintiff did
not allege that Ashcroft and Mueller confiscated his Koran. But he did
allege that they formulated the policies that permitted the abuses, knew of
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (calling Iqbal “[t]he most consequential decision of the Supreme
Court’s last term”).
247. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44 (outlining allegations).
248. The Supreme Court decision dealt only with two high-level officials: the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI. Id. at 1942.
249. See supra Part III.C.1.
250. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 150–01 (2d Cir. 2007) (summarizing the litigation in the
district court), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
251. Id. at 151.
252. Id. at 168–77.
253. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009).
254. Id. at 1943. The opinion focuses more on pleading and related issues than on the merits of
each individual claim. See id. at 1942–43.
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and condoned the policies, and acted because of the race, religion, and/or
national origin of the plaintiff and his fellow detainees.255 The Court
treated the case generally as raising a claim of unconstitutional
discrimination.256 It saw the problem as essentially one of supervisory
liability: did the plaintiff adequately claim discrimination by these officials,
or was he attempting to hold them liable for the acts of subordinates?257 If
the latter, any such claim would run into the well-established doctrine that
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”258
The majority held that the plaintiff had failed to meet the requirement
that he “plead that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”259 What is
unclear is whether this is a holding about supervisory liability in the
discrimination context or in every context. The majority opinion can be
read both ways. At times, it focuses on the apparent contention that a
supervisor’s knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose
amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.260 But the majority
is also more categorical: “In a . . . Bivens action—where masters do not
answer for the torts of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a
misnomer.”261
The last sentence appears to remove supervisory liability from Bivens
actions. The dissent read the opinion this way. According to Justice David
Souter, “the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it
is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”262 If accurate, this
broad reading may pose serious problems for plaintiffs suing policy makers
over their individual grievances and for the utility of the civil suit as an
accountability mechanism in examining policies. Plaintiffs would
presumably have to show not just that a policy led to unconstitutional
results, but also that such results were one of its goals. It may be that,
outside the discrimination context, plaintiffs challenging policies such as
extraordinary rendition can make this showing. However, defendants will
certainly try to separate the consequences of a policy from the policy itself.
Much will depend on the attitude of lower courts. In Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,263
decided after Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit offered the following analysis:

255. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1947 (majority opinion).
257. Id. at 1949.
258. Id. at 1948.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1950–52. The Court stated that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a Bivens
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Id. at 1948.
261. Id. at 1949.
262. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No.
10-98).
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Al-Kidd’s complaint does not allege that Ashcroft was
directly involved in the decision to detain al-Kidd. But
“direct, personal participation is not necessary to establish
liability for a constitutional violation.” Supervisors can be
held liable for the actions of their subordinates (1) for setting
in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to
terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict
constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in
training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) for
acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by
subordinates; or (4) for conduct that shows a “reckless or
callous indifference to the rights of others.”264
Not all plaintiffs may be so fortunate.
Given the uncertain standard for substantive liability, the question
arises as to what a plaintiff must plead in order to survive a motion to
dismiss a claim. The pleading issue is regarded as the central point of
Iqbal.265 It has been widely discussed elsewhere;266 I will discuss it briefly
here. The Court put forward a distinction between pleadings that “are no
more than conclusions”267—and thus not entitled to the assumption of
truth—and “well-pleaded factual allegations [that might] plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.”268 Statements that at least implicitly
contain legal conclusions run the risk of falling into the former category.269
Thus, Iqbal’s use of terms like “willfully and maliciously,” “solely on
account of his religion,” etc.,270 appeared to the majority to be nothing
more than the “formulaic recitation” of a legal claim.271 The complaint did
allege facts such as intentionally adopting “restrictive conditions of
confinement.”272 However, the Court reasoned that the more “plausible”
explanation for this conduct was a legitimate, penological one.273
It will take lower courts some time to sort out the pleading implications
of Iqbal. However, it is apparent that plaintiffs who have not yet had the
264. Id. at 965 (citations omitted) (citing Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir.
2004); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)).
265. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 252–
53 (2009) (discussing importance of Iqbal and impact on pleading stage of litigation).
266. E.g., Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas for Congressman’s Testimony to the
House Ethics Committee.—In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 123
HARV. L. REV. 564, 586–87 (2009) (discussing impact of Iqbal on international human rights
litigation).
267. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 1951.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1951–52.
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benefit of discovery will face a challenge in crafting complaints that satisfy
the Court’s more stringent reading of Rule 8. The most likely response is
highly detailed pleadings, with as much “factual” material as possible.
Such a development might seem little more than a departure from the spirit
of the Rules. However, the Iqbal Court indicated a willingness to take a
complaint and decide more than just its sufficiency as a device to get the
case started. The plausibility standard gives the defendant the opportunity
to argue its case at the pleading stage, with the burden apparently on the
plaintiff.274 However Iqbal plays out in the lower courts, it has the potential
to make things harder for plaintiffs in reverse war on terror suits. It is no
coincidence that Iqbal itself was such a suit.
Iqbal was the first reverse war on terror suit decided by the Court in
which the plaintiff sought damages instead of habeas corpus.275 In fact,
Iqbal emerges, totally apart from its significance as a pleading case, as an
important contribution to the doctrine of official immunity from damages
suits. During the same term, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court reemphasized the importance of qualified immunity as “‘an immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’”276 Iqbal makes clear the
majority’s concern for the qualified immunity defense when officials are
responding to “‘a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.’”277 Particularly
significant is the Court’s receptivity to the breadth of the defendants’
collateral appeal of the denial of their qualified immunity defense,
including their attack on the sufficiency of the complaint’s statement of a
cause of action.278 The plaintiff argued that the defendants had presented “a
qualified immunity appeal based solely on the complaint’s failure to state a
claim and not on the ultimate issues relevant to the qualified immunity
defense itself.”279 The majority, however, was unwilling to separate the
issue of the clearly established nature of the plaintiff’s rights from the issue
of whether he had sufficiently alleged that the defendants had violated
them. The latter issue might be viewed as raising points closer to the
merits—an “I didn’t do it” defense—but the Court saw the two as
274. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 265, at 261 (contending
that Iqbal changes plausibility standard into a probability one).
275. The high profile cases from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), to Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), all arose out of petitions for habeas corpus. So far this term, the Court
has issued an opinion in a case testing a major anti-terrorist criminal statute. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (holding statute to be constitutional as
applied to petitioners). It has denied certiorari in private damages suits of the sort under discussion
here. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010), but has granted
certiorari in Al-Kidd.
276. 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
277. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Cabranes, J., concurring)).
278. See id. at 1945–47 (discussing applicability of doctrine).
279. Id. at 1946.
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“inextricably intertwined.”280 Indeed, the Court went further, reading
Wilkie v. Robbins281 as precedent for considering Bivens cause of action
issues on an appeal from a denial of qualified immunity.282 This approach
makes sense if one views immunity broadly as a right not to face trial and
discovery for accusations that are baseless or cannot serve as the basis of
recovery. One can thus find in Iqbal a heightened pleading rule, a
restrictive approach to supervisory liability, and a renewed emphasis on
qualified immunity. The war on terror appears to have driven the Court’s
analysis on all three points, and reverse war on terror plaintiffs may
encounter each or all of them.
4. The State Secrets Privilege
A plaintiff might successfully navigate all these threshold obstacles and
still not reach the merits. A significant obstacle, particularly in suits
involving the war on terror, is the state secrets privilege.283 “Under the
state secrets doctrine, the United States may prevent the disclosure of
information in a judicial proceeding if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that
such disclosure ‘will expose military matters which, in the interest of
national security, should not be divulged.’”284 Building on the concept of
“military,” both the Bush and Obama administrations have invoked the
privilege in suits involving such war on terror matters as extraordinary
rendition.285 Critics have long argued that the privilege runs counter to the
legal system’s provision of relief through constitutional tort actions and,
indeed, to Marbury itself.286 As Professor Robert Chesney puts it,
“concerns for democratic accountability are especially acute when the
privilege is asserted in the face of allegations of unconstitutional
government conduct.”287 Courts differ over the extent to which the
privilege operates to exclude evidence as opposed to the extent to which it
operates as a rule of non-justiciability with respect to the entire subject
matter of a particular suit.288 In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,289 a
280. Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)).
281. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
282. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946. But see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609
(2009) (reaffirming general narrowness of collateral order doctrine).
283. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 124 (criticizing Bush administration’s extensive use of
privilege in war on terror civil suits).
284. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
285. See Editorial, supra note 50 (criticizing both administrations).
286. Cf. Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1962–63 (2007) (discussing Marbury within the context of the state secret
privilege).
287. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 (2007).
288. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing different approaches taken by courts).
289. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
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panel of the Ninth Circuit narrowed considerably the “very subject matter”
concept and emphasized the role of the privilege with respect to specific
evidentiary questions.290 The court expressed both separation of powers
concerns about preserving the judiciary’s role and concern for the
individual rights of those asserting harm from government action.
However, on September 8, 2010, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
overruled the panel. The en banc majority viewed the case as one in which
the claims were so “infused” with state secrets that any effort to defend
against them “would create an unjustifiable risk” of revealing them.291
Even under a restrictive view, however, the state secret scales are heavily
weighted in the government’s favor. Exclusion of a single piece of
evidence can force dismissal of a suit. It may make it impossible for the
plaintiff to prove his claim,292 negate the defendant’s ability to mount a
defense,293 or negate the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate standing to
proceed.294 Moreover, while courts purport to “balance,”295 the weighing
process is limited. It is, at most, a partial balancing. It would seem that the
greater the plaintiff’s need for the evidence, the more reluctant the court
should be to find that the privilege attaches.296 However, “even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is
ultimately satisfied that” the privilege applies.297 Deference to the
executive plays a role, of course, even if the court has exercised its
authority to consider the matter in camera.298 Even if the government loses
its claim of privilege, interlocutory review may be available.299
At the moment, the privilege is the object of considerable attention, in
large part because of the role it plays in war on terror litigation. Legislation
to restrict its use has been proposed.300 The executive branch has
promulgated limiting policies and procedures301 but continues to invoke
the privilege.302 It is likely that the privilege will remain a significant factor
in reverse war on terror litigation, although one must recognize that
shifting attitudes toward the privilege could foreshadow a general pro290. Id. at 1003–04.
291. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
292. Cf. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1001.
293. Cf. id.
294. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).
295. E.g., Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003.
296. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
297. Id.
298. Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203.
299. Cf. id. at 1196 (noting that “[t]he district court [sua sponte] certified order for
interlocutory appeal” by plaintiff).
300. See generally State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009).
301. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts &
Agencies, Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege (Sept. 23,
2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf.
302. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 50.
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plaintiff shift.
5. The Merits
Although much of this Article’s focus is on threshold obstacles, it is
important to consider what might happen down the road. The fact that a
suit gets past all the problems listed above and makes it to the merits stage
is no guarantee that it can serve as a full-scale accountability mechanism.
The government might, for example, make a strategic decision to settle.303
The key question is the extent to which the suit will serve the evaluative
component of accountability through having the judiciary “say what the
law is.”304 Suppose the judge’s rulings on all motions are favorable to the
plaintiff and that any collateral appeals—of an immunity denial, for
example—go his way. Suppose further that the judge’s instructions to the
jury reflect the plaintiff’s view of the law. What is the end result if the jury
returns a verdict for the defendant? The plaintiff has nothing to appeal. The
appellate court will never get a chance to say what the law is with respect
to the underlying legal claim beyond what it may have said about immunity
and related issues. Some “law” will be made at this stage.305 Law will also
be made, particularly on motions to dismiss, at the district court level. But
the result is a piecemeal approach to accountability—within any one
lawsuit—particularly if the defendant official wins and can claim
vindication for his actions and the policies they represent. As for
accountability resulting from the potential number of suits, the likelihood
of widely differing results undercuts the goal of uniformity that seems
implicit in the notion of accountability as a guide to future action.
The notion of plaintiffs losing is not fanciful. Any group of lawsuits
will produce a mix of winners and losers. The reverse war on terror suit
seems likely to produce more of the latter. Bivens actions in particular are
regarded as usually ending in defeat for the plaintiff.306 Reverse war on
terror suits may produce a strong combination of attractive defendants—
officials who were protecting the country, perhaps overzealously—and,
frequently, unattractive plaintiffs.
For those who see the civil suit as an opportunity to bring the Bush
303. See Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 121 (D.D.C. 2005). The government settled
Hatfill’s case. See Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist Is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax Suit,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A1.
304. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
305. Professor Aziz Huq refers to “policy arbitrage through procedural manipulation.” Aziz Z.
Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 234 n.40.
306. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 71, at 319 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has been almost
uniformly hostile to would-be plaintiffs since 1982.”). But see Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the
Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 809, 813 (2010) (contending that Bivens actions succeed more frequently than is generally
assumed). The question on which I am focusing is the extension of Bivens availability to claims that
might be viewed as novel, as opposed to the more frequent suit arising out of prison or police
contexts.
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administration to the heel of judicial accountability, the merits pose an
additional risk: judgment for the defendants might include an element of
judicial justification of their acts. Let us assume a suit in which the
plaintiff makes a strong case that he possessed a constitutional right (or
rights) that was violated and in which the defendant does not contest the
facts. It is still open to the defendant to argue that he was entitled to violate
the right. In Iqbal, some defendants advanced the argument that “even if
the law was clearly established as to the existence of a right claimed to
have been violated, it was not clearly established in the extraordinary
circumstances of the 9/11 attack and its aftermath.”307 This argument,
advanced as a claim of immunity, may be based on Judge Posner’s concept
of varying constitutional rights.308 It is possible that courts will be
receptive to the concept of rights that diminish in the context of the war on
terror. It is also possible that courts will consider favorably the argument
that this context gives defendant officials greater authority to infringe
whatever rights the plaintiffs possessed. Although unsuccessful, the Iqbal
defendants argued that “the Government was entitled to take certain
actions that might not have been lawful before 9/11 because the
Government’s interests assumed special weight in the post-9/11
context.”309 The Bush Justice Department discussed these concepts
extensively in evaluating possible prosecutions of officials for torture.310
An Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum emphasized the public
policy concerns that underlie the defenses of “necessity” and “selfdefense.”311 For example, the OLC stated its belief “that a claim by an
individual of the defense of another would be . . . supported by the fact
that, in this case, the nation is under attack and has the right to selfdefense.”312 The OLC analysis has been criticized.313 More importantly, it
is not clear how these concepts derived from the criminal law would apply
to civil suits. But suppose there is some judicial endorsement of either
defense. A court has spoken; evaluation has taken place. This seems a
perfectly acceptable result if accountability is viewed as a two-way street.
In sum, the civil suit emerges as a possible accountability mechanism. It
is perhaps closer to the retributive model than to the inquiry model, but it
does bring into play the impartiality and legitimacy of the judicial system.
307. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2009).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 235–37.
309. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 159.
310. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE MEMOS 41, 90 –99 (David Cole ed.,
2009).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
313. See, e.g., THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 185, at 23–24. But see Pines, supra note 33,
at 143–53 (defending practice of Attorney General opinions and reliance thereon as a defense to
criminal and civil suits).
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It can be seen as a default version of the commission model. Moreover, as
far as involving the judicial system is concerned, the civil damages suit is
the only game in town. Injunctive actions and prosecutions each face
numerous hurdles,314 and are unlikely to play a significant role as
accountability mechanisms. At the same time, the civil tort suit faces
serious problems as well. This Article thus turns to the obvious next
question: given the fact that war on terror civil suits do not constitute a
radical new species of litigation, and given their potential to serve as
accountability mechanisms, why does the legal system throw so many
obstacles in their paths?
IV. WHAT EXPLAINS THE SYSTEMIC RESISTANCE TO REVERSE WAR ON
TERROR ACTIONS?
A. General Considerations
The civil suit (usually a Bivens action) seems well-positioned to play
the role of accountability mechanism. It can contribute to all four stages of
accountability: informing; justification; evaluation; and rectification,
defined as compensation, sanctions, and deterrence/guidance.315 The notion
of important public law decisions being made through adjudication
is hardly a novel one. Yet, the legal system makes reverse war on
terror suits extraordinarily difficult to bring. As the Second Circuit put
it: “Our federal system of checks and balances provides means to
consider allegedly unconstitutional executive policy, but a private action
for . . . damages . . . is not one of them.”316 In this Part, I examine why, and
I consider two possible explanations. The first—developed in section B—
is what might be labeled as “institutional concerns.” The notion here is that
the limits of the tort suit make such actions unsuitable vehicles for the
broad policy determinations that accountability seems to require, especially
when those decisions are cast in constitutional stone. The analysis
considers arguments on both sides and concludes that the institutional
arguments against the tort suit have some weight but are hardly dispositive.
Section C argues that the crucial variable is that the suits under
consideration involve the war on terror. Concerns about the role of the
judiciary in national security become central. Deference to the political
branches becomes, in effect, a “special factor counseling hesitation” in a
general sense.
B. Their Finest Hour—the “Public Law” Litigation and its Bearing on
Tort Suits
Injunctive relief, particularly against Bush administration officials, is
314. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
316. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009).
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largely unavailable to war on terror plaintiffs attacking policies. Yet,
paradoxically, the notion of courts as accountability mechanisms derives
much of its force from a form of injunctive action that played a central role
in late 20th Century debates about the role of courts in America—the
institutional reform or “public law” litigation made famous by Professor
Abram Chayes.317 Chayes focused on litigation aimed at a wide variety of
governmental practices,318 and he insisted that “[w]e are witnessing the
emergence of a new model of civil litigation.”319 Salient characteristics of
this new model included the increasing importance of equitable relief, a
strong judicial effect on future events, awareness of the policy functions of
litigation and its impact on persons not before the court, a willingness to
engage in the sort of broad fact-finding engaged in by legislatures, and the
central role of the judicial decree.320 Indeed, the suits were portrayed as
giving access to political power to those who lacked it.321
A major theme of the proponents of this litigation, such as Chayes and
Professor Owen Fiss,322 was their attempt to legitimize a broad societal
role for the courts—one that is central to any attempt to use them as
accountability mechanisms, whatever form the action may take. Chayes
found legitimacy in “the ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain
itself” in a continuous dialogue with “other political elements,” including
“the press and wider publics.”323 Within this dialogue, “judicial action
[could] only achieve[] . . . legitimacy by responding to, indeed by stirring,
the deep and durable demand for justice in our society.”324 The public lawsuits of the late 20th Century were thus direct descendants of Marbury.325
Scholarly interest in these suits continues.326
Current attempts to use the courts as war on terror accountability
mechanisms draw on the public law model as a source of legitimacy. David
Zaring states that “[t]he high profile policy-directed tort suit[s]” are “in
some ways inheriting the mantel of institutional reform litigation.”327 They
317. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 passim (1976).
318. See id. at 1284.
319. Id. at 1282.
320. See id. at 1292–1302.
321. See id. at 1315.
322. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) (“The function of a judge is to give concrete meaning and application to
our constitutional values.”).
323. Chayes, supra note 317, at 1316.
324. Id.
325. See id. (contrasting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), with Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
326. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (discussing various
analyses regarding deterrent effects of civil litigation on government officials and contending that
access to useful information about suits should play a central role).
327. Zaring, supra note 71, at 338–39.
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become almost “an alternative form of administration as well. The suits
certainly seek to constrain government officials, and if they do not often
succeed in that, they do garner attention, which may, ultimately, generate
political coalitions to provide the relief that doctrine does not.”328 The suits
in question may be tort actions, but their scope is often broader than any
defendant or group of defendants. As Professor Amar points out,
“[p]ervasive and systematic illegality will not always be traceable to
specific individuals who can be called to account.”329
The mantel only extends so far, however. Tort suits are quite different
from equitable actions in such key matters as fact-finding, retrospective as
opposed to prospective relief, range of participation, and remedial powers
of the trial judge. Another important difference is that the public law
actions drew much of their legitimacy from the fact that federal judicial
power was exercised largely over state and local institutions. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides direct support for supervision of these
institutions. Even in this context, the Court expressed reservations about
ongoing federal judicial control over state military (National Guard)
actions.330 On the other hand, federal judges may feel a “special political
vulnerability”331 when asked to oversee, even indirectly, policies and
activities of their co-ordinate branches.
There are obviously other limits to the role that individual tort suits can
play as forums about national policy. Consider the following observations
by a congressional committee, as quoted by a federal court:
“[T]he development of the law regulating electronic
surveillance for national security purposes has been uneven
and inconclusive. This is to be expected where the
development is left to the judicial branch in an area where
cases do not regularly come before it. Moreover, the
development of standards and restrictions by the judiciary
with respect to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes accomplished through case law threatens both civil
liberties and the national security because that development
occurs generally in ignorance of the facts, circumstances, and
techniques of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance not
present in the particular case before the court.
. . . [T]he tiny window to this area which a particular case
affords provides inadequate light by which judges may be
relied upon to develop case law which adequately balances
the rights of privacy and national security.”332
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 339.
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1487 (1987).
See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–10 (1973).
Amar, supra note 329, at 1508.
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119–20
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These concerns are not limited to the field of national security. The tort
suit does not usually examine generalized manifestations of a phenomenon.
It is restricted to a particular claim and defenses to it. Parties do not engage
in a broad-ranging search for truth; they strive to convince the fact-finder
of a particular narrative, to discredit alternative versions, and to exclude
evidence that does not support their views. Trial courts do not have the
fact-finding resources of a legislature. Moreover, the central role of the jury
introduces a wild card. The equity courts at the center of the public law
model utilize a more “polycentric” party structure than the adversarial
model and can benefit from broader fact-finding capabilities. The contrast
with the commission model is even sharper. Commissions such as the 9/11
Commission have a broad mandate and broad leeway in getting there. They
are not party driven, encumbered by rules of evidence, or necessarily
limited to highly fact-specific determinations. In ideal form, they should
lack the partisan nature that the adversarial quality of lawsuits could
engender.
Nonetheless, I do not think that the aspects of the tort action discussed
above—particularly the “tiny window critique”—necessarily disqualify it
from playing an important role as an accountability mechanism. We have
posited the goals of accountability to be the following: discovery and
exposition of official conduct; explanation and justification by the
officials; evaluation of the conduct’s legality by an authoritative source;
and rectification, defined as compensation and the imposition of sanctions,
if appropriate, norm articulation that will deter the particular officials if
necessary, and provision of guidance for officials in the future.333 In terms
of achieving these goals, a tort suit of the Bivens or similar variety that
proceeds to the merits looks pretty good. The facts are aired and “found.”
The official’s defense will almost certainly offer a justification. Judicial
opinions, particularly at the appellate stage, will evaluate that defense.
Compensation may be awarded. A successful suit will provide deterrence.
The opinions, both on merits issues and on collateral matters such as
immunity, will provide guidance.
An additional reason for viewing favorably the tort action as an
accountability mechanism is the legitimacy factor. Federal court judgments
are generally viewed as legitimate, particularly in the area of constitutional
law,334 and Bivens actions are a form of constitutional adjudication. The
legitimacy of any “judgment” about an aspect of the Bush administration’s
anti-terrorism policies is an extremely important point. The subject is
intensely controversial and political. If those who oppose the judgment can
attack the institution that rendered it—say for being too political or too
partisan—its ability to serve the broader goals of accountability is
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978)).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 56–63.
334. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (discussing the “basic principle” of federal
judicial supremacy in constitutional law).
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compromised. I do not seek to somehow wish away objections to a
substantial judicial role in national governance—questions such as the
“counter-majoritarian” difficulty,335 for example. Indeed, such objections
may be particularly acute in the national security area when the courts
place themselves at odds with the political branches. One of the theses of
this Article is that there are substantial reasons—referred to in shorthand
form as deference and discussed in the next section—for courts not to do
this. But that thesis does not rest on any notion of the courts’ illegitimacy
as deciders of major public issues. Indeed, it is the very fact of their
legitimacy that might lead one to accept their default role as accountability
mechanisms to review Bush-era anti-terrorism policies.
Any discussion of the legitimacy of the tort suit as an accountability
mechanism would be incomplete without a reference to Professor Lon
Fuller’s analysis of courts as articulators of public values through the
process of adjudication.336 Fuller’s views are sometimes presented as
focused on a narrow “dispute resolution model” as opposed to the broader
“public law model” discussed above.337 Professor Robert Bone has
persuasively challenged this notion.338 For Bone, “Fuller viewed
adjudication as a profoundly public institution with a vitally important
social function. It was through the process of adjudication that reason was
applied to the task of developing frameworks to order the ongoing process
of human interaction, including the articulation of public norms.”339 For
Fuller, the sharply focused adversary process permits the judge to see a
problem from all relevant sides. He described the fact “of advocacy [as]
not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of
human insight in the design of a social framework within which man’s
capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization.”340 Bone
summarized “the core purpose of adjudication” as follows: “By focusing
on actual disputes, the process of adjudication brought the abstract into
productive relation with the concrete. Courts learned about the specifics of
context at the same time as they reasoned about the implications of general
principle.”341
There are, however, three problems that stand in the way of a perfect fit
between civil suits and the desire for accountability in the context of Bush
era war on terror policies. The first is that the “tiny window” problem is
particularly acute in suits that amount to constitutionally based attacks on
335. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
336. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 363–65
(1978).
337. Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1274–75 (1995).
338. See id. at 1279–82.
339. Id. at 1282.
340. Fuller, supra note 336, at 384.
341. Bone, supra note 337, at 1305.
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entire policies. No one suit can address an entire issue. Claims will arise
out of specific “transaction[s] or occurrence[s].”342 Thus, we see discrete
suits concerning such matters as “extraordinary rendition,” conditions of
confinement, the consequences of high-level legal advice, and alleged
misuse of detention of material witnesses. These constitutional tort suits
will raise—and decide—important constitutional questions as part of
challenges to national policies. Yet, the matters at issue may not be
representative of the general policy. It might be contended that a policy is
essentially a method for dealing with a wide, unknown number of similar
incidents and that a decision that evaluates one instance of treatment of a
problem sheds light on the entire method. However, the incident giving
rise to a particular claim may not be representative of the universe of
potential incidents that generated the policy. Public interest lawyers, for
example, may focus on egregious events in order to discredit an entire
policy that, viewed in its entirety, serves important governmental interests.
Iqbal’s generous treatment of the defendants’ motives in rounding up
Muslim men343 seems to reflect a recognition that a discrete set of facts can
obscure the reasons for a generalized course of action.
Moreover, the various policies that make up the war on terror, for
which accountability is sought, have yielded a number of tort suits. They
will proceed at different paces and yield conflicting results. It is hard to
reconcile, for example, the344
Second Circuit’s finding of Bivens “special
factors” in Arar v. Ashcroft 345with the California district court’s refusal to
find them in Padilla v. Yoo. Rulings on the state secrets privilege will
differ,346 as will those on supervisory liability.347 Some cases may actually
go to trial; others may settle; others may be disposed of on non-merits
grounds; others may fall by the wayside. The multiplicity of suits
substantially weakens the goal of authoritative elaboration. It is not an
answer to say that someday the Supreme Court will step in to provide
answers. “Someday” could take years. If we want an accounting while the
Bush era is still fresh in our memories, and if we want guidance about what
to do about terrorism now, civil suits may not be the answer.
A second problem is that, despite the arguments advanced by Fuller and
others, judges have frequently questioned the use of the tort suit as a
vehicle to question broad governmental decisions. A well-known example
342. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
343. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951–52 (2009).
344. 585 F.3d 559, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
345. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss, with the
exception of a single claim dismissed with leave to amend); see also Brown, supra note 16, at 880–
81 (discussing different approaches in the two decisions).
346. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2009)
(discussing alternative approaches to privilege), rev’d, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), and aff’d en
banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
347. The approach to supervisory liability found in Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964–65
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98), seems at
variance with the Supreme Court’s views on supervisory liability as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
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is United States v. Varig Airlines,348 a statutory case involving the Federal
Tort Claims Act, in which the Supreme Court cited Congress’s desire to
“prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the
medium of an action in tort.”349 In Schneider v. Kissinger,350 a 2005
decision with a distinct war on terror flavor,351 the District of Columbia
Circuit declared that “recasting foreign policy and national security
questions in tort terms does not provide standards for making or reviewing
foreign policy judgments.”352 Moreover, the court seemed willing to extend
the shield of policy to the means of implementing it, at least where those
means were implicit in the original policy.353 In the court’s view, “[t]o
determine whether drastic measures should be taken in matters of foreign
policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication but of
policymaking.”354 Of course, in a constitutional tort suit, a policy and the
means of executing it may blend into one claim, a possibility that the
Schneider court seemed to foresee.355
In the constitutional context, opponents of the Bivens action have long
expressed a preference for equitable relief and doubts about the basic
concept of a “constitutional tort.” Dissenting in Carlson v. Green,356
Justice Rehnquist noted the long-established “power of federal courts to
grant equitable relief for constitutional violations,” citing Marbury as an
example.357
“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and
private needs as well as between competing private

348. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
349. Id. at 814. The Court earlier pointed to legislative history in which a government official
stated that “[i]t is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality
of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be tested through the
medium of a damage suit for tort.” Id. at 809–10; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
27 (1953).
350. 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
351. The case involved claims arising out of a CIA effort to destabilize a socialist government
in Chile. Id. at 191–92.
352. Id. at 197.
353. See id. at 198.
354. Id. at 197.
355. Id. at 197–98.
356. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
357. Id. at 42 & n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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claims.”358
These arguments bear some similarity to those of the original Bivens
dissenters.359 Indeed, although the Bivens doctrine is still alive, the
Supreme Court has engaged in a substantial retrenchment beginning in the
1980s.360 It is clear that the Court regarded several of these suits as directed
at policy beyond merely presenting claims for redress of a distinct tort.361
Justice Rehnquist returned to the subject in his dissent in Butz v.
Economou.362 He reiterated the point that Marbury “involved equitabletype relief by way of mandamus or injunction.”363 More importantly, he
stressed:
[T]he threat of injunctive relief without the possibility of
damages in the case of a Cabinet official is a better tailoring
of the competing need to vindicate individual rights, on the
one hand, and the equally vital need, on the other, that federal
officials exercising discretion will be unafraid to take
vigorous action to protect the public interest.364
The notion that tort suits play less of a role in vindicating the public
interest resurfaced in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.365 The Court distinguished a
“merely private suit for damages” from “an ongoing criminal prosecution”
or an action to maintain the separation of powers.366 It is, of course, true
that courts—particularly state courts—have long made governmental
policy through the processes of the common law. Tort cases are a strong
example. In the constitutional area, individual criminal cases are often the
vehicles for important new rules.367 Outside that area, however, we are
358. Id. at 43 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944)).
359. See Bandes, supra note 79, at 299–303 (comparing Rehnquist dissent with the Bivens
dissents).
360. See Brown, supra note 16, at 858–61.
361. For example, the Court in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), cited “federal personnel
policy.” Id. at 380–81. In United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), the Court stated that
“congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.” Id. at
683.
362. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
363. Id. at 523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court in Boumediene referred to habeas
corpus as an equitable remedy. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 780 (2008). Referring to habeas
corpus actions, Professor Huq argues that a development along these lines can be found in national
security litigation when “de facto structural injunctions” lead to “significant change in national
security programs,” although he notes that those bringing the actions may receive few benefits.
Huq, supra note 305, at 248.
364. Butz, 438 U.S. at 524.
365. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
366. Id. at 754 & n.37.
367. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
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used to constitutional law on such vital matters as desegregation, abortion,
school prayer, and free speech being made primarily in equitable actions.368
It is not coincidental that the Supreme Court’s retreat from Bivens began
with cases aimed at the structure of governmental programs or underlying
policies.369 A single tort decision can bring an entire national program to a
halt. The core of the problem is whether one views constitutional tort suits
as taking courts too far beyond their adjudicative function or whether one
agrees with Professor Bandes’ contention that “the courts’ particularization
function inevitably involves precedent setting and norm creation. The
difference between decisions that bind discrete parties and those that bind
large groups is a matter of degree, not of kind.”370
A third institutional problem is that some reverse war on terror suits can
be seen as political maneuvers in which political actors—seeking to
perform the role of private attorneys general—utilize the tort system for
purposes other than the resolution of disputes. Professor David Zaring has
analyzed the “[c]onstitutional [t]ort [a]gainst [p]olicy.”371 He describes
“high-profile cases [in which] winning the lawsuit is less precisely the
point than is practicing increasingly personal politics while calling
attention to a policy and a plight.”372 For Zaring, “[t]hese suits are more
symbolic than likely to succeed, in that they rely not on the verdict, but on
the ability to make a claim against a policy-maker.”373
Professor Margulies views them as part of the “vast repertoire” of
“crossover advocacy.”374 This advocacy can include enlisting the media
and foreign governments as well as academic scholarship and damages
suits.375 Margulies also sees the potential political dimension. He
characterizes Jose Padilla’s suit against John Yoo as “[u]sing [l]itigation to

state court.”).
368. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). The First Amendment area might be
viewed as an exception, in that a substantial number of free speech cases have been criminal
actions. E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
369. See Brown, supra note 16, at 883.
370. Bandes, supra note 79, at 305 (footnotes omitted). Professor Huq advocates emphasis on
remedies because “[i]t invites particular scrutiny of the question whether an individual judgment’s
effect rippled out to change larger institutional practices.” Huq, supra note 305, at 234. His view of
damage suits seems ambiguous. At one point he describes them as “a means to challenge isolated
acts of abuse, but no avenue for effecting larger programmatic change.” Id. at 243. But see id. at 252
(discussing view that constitutional tort litigation “limits future options by articulating new
constitutional norms to constrain subsequent executives”). Tort suits may also present the risk of
what Professor Margulies calls “hindsight bias.” See Margulies, supra note 192, at 204 (describing
hindsight bias as that which “makes every official mistake seem avoidable”). This article is an
excellent overview of the role of Bivens actions in the national security context.
371. Zaring, supra note 71, at 331–39.
372. Id. at 332.
373. Id. at 335.
374. Margulies, supra note 74, at 348.
375. See id. at 364–72.
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[s]ettle [i]deological [s]cores.”376
Of course, many controversial lawsuits can be criticized as “political,”
including such staples as desegregation actions, challenges to legislative
apportionment, and claims of politically motivated personnel actions.
Similarly, the notion of the private attorney general is not new, although it
is best known in the different context of congressional authorization of
suits against private parties and governments, mainly at the state and local
level.377 Like “political” lawsuits, it can be controversial. On the one hand,
Professor Pamela Karlan applauds it for going beyond Marbury and its
emphasis on private disputes to putting courts in a position where they
“‘explicate and give force’” to public values.378 On the other hand,
Professor Jeremy Rabkin warns that “[t]hose who disagree with the
political agenda of the lawyers will not be pleased to see them advance it
through litigation. The lawyers can say they are performing a public
service, but others will see their role as partisan.”379 The point is sharply
illustrated by the fact that legal support for many reverse war on terror suits
has come from vigorous opponents of the Bush administration and its
policies.
Neither Margulies nor Zaring seems to view the label “political” as
fatal. Margulies is clearly sympathetic to war on terror detainees and their
lawyers. He seems mainly concerned with pointing out the risks of
crossover advocacy, including unintended consequences,380 and with
cautioning those who engage in it to look before they leap.381 Zaring’s
position is also ambiguous but tilting more to the negative side. He sees
symbolic value in the suits and presents them as providing “a sort of
democratic access” to government leaders.382 He also sees the tiny window
problem as an advantage of decentralized governance: “[I]t tracks issues
into specific, small-scale, problem-solving institutions, like particular cases
overseen by particular courts.”383 However, he questions the enforcement
value of suits that are rarely won,384 and he also questions the value of
“symbolism without . . . substance.”385 To the extent that lawsuits portend
“an alternative form of administration,” Zaring is dubious about its
success. 386
376. Id. at 409.
377. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183 (discussing how the Supreme Court created a remedy gap by undercutting private
individual empowerment by Congress to bring suit to vindicate public policy goals).
378. Id. at 201 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)).
379. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179, 195 (1998).
380. See Margulies, supra note 74, at 413–21.
381. See id. at 422.
382. Zaring, supra note 71, at 317–18.
383. Id. at 366.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 358.
386. Id. at 339.
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Although they do not view “political” as fatal, both analysts express
grave concern about the political nature of the war on terror civil suits.
Zaring asks the following question: “[A]lthough courts are not letting
purely political claims proceed, the plaintiffs who sue are often quite
political—and, as we have discussed, the criminal cases against high
government officials have also been rather politicized themselves. Is such a
political process worth it?”387
Margulies raises another concern:
Crossover advocates’ targeting of Yoo and other
administration officials also threatens political polarization, of
the kind that was routine during the era of the Independent
Counsel statute. Prosecuting senior officials for war crimes
might trigger prosecutions of political officials of the other
party in a subsequent administration. The imperatives of
partisan payback might squeeze out any hope of bipartisan
problem-solving.388
For purposes of this Article, the emphasis on “political” raises two
questions: Does the political nature of the suits threaten the legitimacy of
courts that entertain them? And does the accompanying adversariness
vitiate the courts’ abilities to serve as accountability mechanisms? As to
the first, as noted above, many lawsuits can be characterized as political.
The label does not somehow delegitimize them or the courts that hear
them. Moreover, it is hard to distinguish suits that are political—or too
political—from those that are not and that “should” be heard. One could
even argue that the aptly named political question doctrine performs this
function with some success. As I have contended elsewhere,389 the courts
may have incorporated political questioning reasoning into the Bivens
threshold inquiry. Perhaps the result is to help screen out political reverse
war on terror suits. As for adversariness, it is endemic to the judicial
process and to any recourse to it. Thus, the second question asked above
simply begs the larger question of the extent to which the (inherently
adversarial) judicial process (particularly the civil suit) should constitute an
integral part of the broader search for accountability for the anti-terrorism
policies of the Bush administration.
Institutional concerns do pose problems. However, by themselves, they
may not be sufficiently severe to block a broad role for the judicial process
in the form of the civil suit. There is no basic problem of legitimacy as
long as one accepts the judicial function in constitutional adjudication and
recognizes that our society has long looked to adjudication as a source for
the development and exposition of public values in the course of resolving
disputes. The arguments that the suits in question seem political or that
387. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
388. Margulies, supra note 74, at 416 (footnote omitted).
389. See Brown, supra note 16, at 889–92.
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they run counter to a preference for equity over law in constitutional
adjudication have weight, but do not seem dispositive. The experience of
§ 1983 suits against state and local governments—legal as well as
equitable—is particularly relevant. However, we must again face the
question as to whether § 1983 suits and Bivens actions are truly parallel. In
particular, war on terror Bivens actions not only pit the federal courts
against the political branches, but they also do so in the area of national
security.
C. The Obstacles to Civil Suits as an Example of National Security
Deference
It is, of course, a truism that suits challenging aspects of the war on
terror inevitably run into the precept that the judiciary should show
considerable deference to the political branches on issues of national
security.390 “National security,” in this context, can have a broad meaning,
although its genesis appears to be found in cases presenting military
issues.391 Thus, one could develop the thesis that reverse war on terror suits
are hard to bring because they often encounter deference-based obstacles.
These might include the following: the notions of national security
concerns as special factors counseling hesitation in allowing Bivens claims,
the use of the state secrets privilege to thwart or limit a suit, or a special
claim of immunity in the war on terror context.
I want to suggest a different way of looking at the phenomenon.
Consider the possibility that national security deference to the political
branches, particularly the executive, is built into the constitutional
system392 and that a consistent refusal to allow war on terror civil suits to
proceed past the threshold reflects that deference. Rather than simply a set
of discrete, articulated doctrines that affect portions of the suits, there is a
broader, unarticulated doctrine disfavoring them generally. National
security deference reaches its zenith in the war on terror context.
The Supreme Court suggested as much in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.393 In
rejecting the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, it noted that “the
Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure
conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist
activity.”394 I find implicit in these remarks the notion that such decisions
390. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009).
391. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988).
392. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1023 (2007) (describing
the Supreme Court’s treatment of national defense issues as a “compromise approach of taking
jurisdiction but showing healthy deference to the political branches”). Professor Robert Pushaw’s
highly important contributions to the subject of deferential judicial review are discussed infra in the
text accompanying notes 401–26.
393. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
394. Id. at 1952.
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are not to be second-guessed in a tort suit. Especially given the extensive
discussion of the national security context, the notion is explicit in the
Second Circuit’s statement in Arar that “[o]ur federal system of checks and
balances provides means to consider allegedly unconstitutional executive
policy, but a private action for money damages against individual
policymakers is not one of them.”395
The question can be rephrased as asking whether national security
deference is case-specific or whether it applies generally to reverse war on
terror suits, viewed as a single phenomenon. A typical quote, from the
Fourth Circuit decision in El-Masri v. United States,396 suggests a general
approach in the context of a case involving the state secrets privilege:
The Reynolds Court balanced those concerns by leaving
the judiciary firmly in control of deciding whether an
executive assertion of the state secrets privilege is valid, but
subject to a standard mandating restraint in the exercise of its
authority. A court is obliged to honor the Executive's
assertion of the privilege if it is satisfied, “from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.” In assessing the risk that such a disclosure might
pose to national security, a court is obliged to accord the
“utmost deference” to the responsibilities of the executive
branch. Such deference is appropriate not only for
constitutional reasons, but also practical ones: the Executive
and the intelligence agencies under his control occupy a
position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the
consequences of a release of sensitive information. In the
related context of confidentiality classification decisions, we
have observed that “[t]he courts, of course, are ill-equipped to
become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to
serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in
that area.” The executive branch's expertise in predicting the
potential consequences of intelligence disclosures is
particularly important given the sophisticated nature of
modern intelligence analysis, in which “[t]he significance of
one item of information may frequently depend upon
knowledge of many other items of information,” and “[w]hat
may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may
put the questioned item of information in its proper context.”
In the same vein, in those situations where the state secrets
privilege has been invoked because disclosure risks impairing
395. Arar, 585 F.3d at 574.
396. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
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our foreign relations, the President's assessment of the
diplomatic situation is entitled to great weight.397
Lack of judicial competence, in particular, is a recurring theme, one
which the Supreme Court accepted as recently as Munaf v. Geren,398
decided the same day as Boumediene.399 In response to a challenge to the
executive’s decision that the plaintiffs were not likely to be tortured if
remitted to the Iraqi judicial system, the Supreme Court said that “[t]he
Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinations—
determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on
foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s ability to speak
with one voice in this area.”400
In developing the deference explanation, I have drawn heavily on the
seminal treatment of deference in the writings of Professor Robert
Pushaw.401 Pushaw views the Supreme Court as having adopted “the
compromise approach of taking jurisdiction but showing healthy deference
to the political branches.”402 There is, of course, a wide range of views
among academics as to the desirability of deference. Professor Geoffrey
Stone argues that decision-makers are particularly prone to failure in times
of crisis.403 They are liable to be too quick to exaggerate dangers and to
sacrifice civil liberties.404 Professor Chesney cautions against undue
judicial deference to the political branches at the expense of the courts’
recognition of their own competence.405 For the purposes of this
discussion, I will take Professor Pushaw’s description as an accurate
portrayal of current judicial practice. Certainly, the recent decision in
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project406 is a strong example of national
security deference. I will also use “deference” in a general sense without
attempting to distinguish between narrow issues of fact and broader issues
of policy.407
There is an important difference, however, between what I view as the
current situation—deference manifested by making a class of suits virtually
397. Id. at 304–05 (internal citations omitted).
398. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
399. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
400. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226.
401. See generally, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Defending Deference: A Response to Professors
Epstein and Wells, 69 MO. L. REV. 959 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the
Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 1165 (2002) [hereinafter Pushaw, Judicial Review]; Pushaw, supra note 392.
402. Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1023.
403. Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law’s Open Areas, 86 B.U.
L. Rev. 1315, 1327–28 (2006).
404. Id. at 1328.
405. See Chesney, supra note 55, at 1409.
406. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
407. See Chesney, supra note 55, at 1398 (discussing decisions “that shade into policy
judgments”).
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impossible to bring—and Pushaw’s favored solution. He views the
Article III federal courts as having a necessary role to play when military
and foreign affairs considerations can impact individual rights, as in the
war on terror.408 Reviewing doctrine and case law from the founding to the
present, Pushaw presents the following analysis: “[F]ederal judges have
always entertained claims that military decisions have violated individual
rights, albeit under very forgiving standards and with an awareness of
political realities. I believe that such lenient judicial review is appropriate,
and I would not endorse complete judicial abdication except in very rare
and limited circumstances.”409 Deference is thus seen as close to, but less
severe than, non-justiciability. In the reverse war on terror context, it
basically leads to the latter. This can be seen in the working of individual
doctrines such as Bivens and in the combined impact of the totality of
doctrines discussed here on would-be plaintiffs.
If one accepts Pushaw’s analysis, the de facto abdication I have
suggested here runs counter to established constitutional tradition. It also
virtually eliminates the role of the civil suit as an accountability
mechanism. The plaintiff files a complaint, often with fanfare, thus
presenting some information, but a threshold dismissal eliminates the other
stages. Pushaw’s approach at least gives us information, justification, and
evaluation, even though the evaluation apparently always tilts strongly
towards the government. “[M]ilitary or foreign affairs decisions that
allegedly violate individual legal rights . . . are judicially reviewable, but
under standards that resolve every doubt in favor of the validity of the
government’s action.”410 Merits decisions might accord more weight to
defenses such as necessity and self-defense, thus providing a form of
guidance. If the defendant wins, there is no sanction or compensation. One
might view the present array of doctrines as a blunt instrument that
deprives the civil suit of almost all its utility. Pushaw’s more nuanced
approach has a twofold advantage: the judicial process is not eliminated as
an accountability mechanism, and the potential shift in emphasis to the
merits permits more stages of accountability to come into play. Of course,
to reach this point, it would be necessary to rethink the doctrines that
currently block reverse war on terror suits at the threshold. Such a
development may be occurring with the state secrets privilege, for
example, but for it to happen across the board would represent a significant
doctrinal shift. A broader pro-plaintiff shift cannot be ruled out, for
example, with respect to issues such as immunity and Bivens. However, the
continuation of a high degree of deference leading to dismissal seems
likely.
As noted, the desirability of deference is a matter as to which opinions
differ sharply. Scholars have argued that normal standards of judicial
review should apply to any examination by courts of actions of the political
408. See Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1079.
409. Id. at 1079 n.341.
410. Pushaw, Judicial Review, supra note 401, at 1199.
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branches.411 There is force to the contention that judicial review is
especially important in national security issues. The risk is great that the
political branches will diminish the importance of civil liberties in times of
a crisis such as the war on terror.412 It is at such moments that the
independent Article III judiciary plays a particularly essential role as the
only branch that can ensure a balance of constitutional values. Indeed, the
textual foundations of national security deference are weaker than the
functional ones. The fact that the Constitution grants the political branches
a number of powers in this area413 should not distinguish it from other
areas where the Constitution grants powers. As for the judicial branch, all
it has under the Constitution is the ability to hear cases and controversies
that fit within the judicial power conferred by Article III.414 The question is
whether the nature of the national security powers assigned to the political
branches calls for a different approach to judicial review of their exercise.
Still, the notion of national security deference is deeply ingrained in our
constitutional tradition. Its institutional foundations make sense, as ably
demonstrated by Professor Pushaw.415 The question that arises is whether
things have changed with the Court’s decisions in a series of “enemy
combatant” cases since the onset of the war on terror.416 These cases have
arisen in the context of petitions for habeas corpus. The Court, as Professor
Pushaw puts it, “interpreted the habeas corpus statute generously,”417 even
to the point of distortion.418 On the other hand, the substantive results
represented a mixed bag of defects and victories for the President. “[T]hese
three cases did not necessarily signal a major shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence in which individual liberties will be upheld vigorously
against executive claims of national security.”419 Professor Pushaw wrote
these words before Boumediene v. Bush,420 in which the Court took on both
political branches. Boumediene, far more than its immediate predecessors,
might be seen as the case that broke the back of national security
411. See Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1006 & nn.10–11, 1007, 1078 & n.339 (discussing
criticism of deference). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 118–19 (3d ed.
2009) (discussing judicial role in foreign policy).
412. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545–46 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (“In a
government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed
liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well entrusted to the
Executive Branch of Government, whose particular responsibility is to maintain security.”).
413. See, e.g., Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194–96 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasizing
the number of different powers that the document grants to the executive and legislative branches).
414. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. With Congressional sanction, the courts also have a limited
power to make certain appointments. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This limited grant of power does not
detract from the general statement in the text.
415. Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1078–83.
416. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
417. Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1054.
418. Id. at 1055.
419. Id. at 1056.
420. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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deference.421 The majority opinion emphasized the judiciary’s Marburybased role as the branch that says “what the law is,”422 echoing its earlier
statement in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld423 that the Constitution “most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake.”424
On the other hand, it is possible to see Boumediene as resting primarily
on the key role of habeas corpus. The Court proclaimed the writ’s
“centrality,” noting that “protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was
one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the
outset, had no Bill of Rights.”425 I have raised elsewhere the argument that
one should not extrapolate too far from the habeas cases, even if they are
viewed as an assertion of the judicial role.426 Habeas raises the
fundamental question of the lawfulness of executive detention and often
presents the judiciary with familiar issues of the validity of procedures.
Reverse war on terror suits would take the courts much further.
Certainly, the Court’s two most recent war on terror decisions show a
reluctance to go further and may even constitute a retrenchment. The
importance of Ashcroft v. Iqbal427 has already been noted. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project428 points in the same direction. Holder upheld a
criminal statute that is a crucial component of the war on terror.429 It did so
in the face of a vigorous First Amendment challenge, supported by three
Justices.430 Both cases show deference toward the government and
appreciation of the difficulties of waging the war on terror. Iqbal noted that
“the Nation’s top law enforcement officers [were acting] in the aftermath
of a devastating terrorist attack . . . .”431 Holder’s language is even
stronger. The Court stated explicitly that deference was appropriate
because “[t]his litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of
national security and foreign affairs.”432 Indeed, the opinion went further—
endorsing the preventive approach to counterterrorism and recognizing the
government’s need to often act “based on informed judgment rather than
concrete evidence.”433 In perhaps the ultimate demonstration of the
421. See David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and
Guantanamo Bay, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 47–48 (2008), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2008/Boumediene_Cole.pdf (calling Boumediene a groundbreaking
decision).
422. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
423. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
424. Id. at 536.
425. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739.
426. Brown, supra note 16, at 899–900.
427. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
428. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
429. Id. at 2730–31.
430. Id. at 2731–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
431. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
432. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (majority opinion).
433. Id. at 2728.
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importance of rhetoric, the Court’s opinion closed with a citation of the
Preamble to the Constitution and its recognition of the need to provide
“‘for the common defence [sic].’”434 Iqbal and Holder stand in stark
contrast to the habeas decisions of a few years earlier.
V. CONCLUSION
The manner in which the Bush administration dealt with terrorism
remains controversial; calls for an “accounting” continue. Yet, a “truth and
reconciliation commission” along the lines proffered by Senator Leahy is
not a realistic possibility, especially since many of the prior policies remain
in place. At the moment, the most likely source of accountability is the
judicial branch. Neither criminal prosecutions nor injunctive actions will
play a significant role in this development. America’s default
accountability mechanism will be the civil tort suit, usually based on the
Bivens constitutional tort doctrine, brought by self-proclaimed victims of
the war on terror.
As this Article demonstrates, a host of judicial doctrines makes reverse
war on terror suits hard to bring. Dismissal at or near the threshold is the
likely result. The analysis posits two reasons, deeply rooted in the legal
system, for this phenomenon: doubts about the tort suit as the means to
effectively make policy through constitutional review and, more
importantly, the role of national security deference in making it hard to
bring suits that are, in effect, challenges to national security policies. This
situation could change. Threshold doctrines such as the bar on Bivens suits
that present “special factors counselling [sic] hesitation” could move in a
pro-plaintiff direction. The result would be more suits, but deference might
then come into play at the merits stage. This result, ironically perhaps,
would be the unleashing of an accountability mechanism that provided a
form of justification of what the Bush administration did. This may well be
a desirable result, especially since so many of the former administration’s
policies have been continued by its successor. The most likely present and
future judicial scenario is an array of suits, most of which are dismissed
well before the merits.
Perhaps the judicial process is not the place to look for accountability.
The emphasis on litigation seems to reflect the retributive motives that
doomed the Leahy commission. Perhaps what is needed is a commission
along the lines of the generalized, nonretributive model. It would look at
past events more with a view to learning about them and from them than
with a view toward making responsible parties pay. The accountability
values of informing, justification, evaluation, and deterrence/compensation
would be paramount. Compensation represents a separate issue and should
be dealt with as such.435 Imposition of liability and sanctions on officials
434. Id. at 2731 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
435. See Brown, supra note 16, at 909 (discussing proposals for a compensation system
outside the judicial process).
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would not be a priority.
I have presented the Leahy proposal and the current civil suits as polar
ends of a possible spectrum. It could include existing institutions such as
congressional committees and inspectors general and new ones such as a
body along the lines of the 9/11 Commission.436 The key point is that
where a polity stands on the accountability sought with respect to any
particular official action will be the dominant factor influencing the choice
of accountability mechanisms to examine that conduct. In the antiterrorism context, let us identify the conduct as the Bush administration’s
war on terror, particularly in its early years. Do we start from a
presumption of unlawfulness and immorality, and thus focus on blame and
liability? Or do we state the central question as how best to fight terror, and
focus on past actions not because they are viewed as “wrong” but because
they are the raw material from which we must work in developing future
policies? These two ways of framing the central question will determine
the accountability approach and the mix of institutions to achieve it. The
retributive commission proposed by Senator Leahy and the adversarial
civil suits being attempted with decidedly mixed results do not represent
the only approaches to accountability. If they both turn out to be failures, it
may be time to seek a different approach.

436. The Commission’s mandate included the following purposes:
(4) make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the
attacks, and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and immediate
response to, the attacks; and
(5) investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to
prevent acts of terrorism.
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 602(4)–(5), 116 Stat.
2383, 2408 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101 note (2006)).
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